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Abstract
Louis de la Forge on Mind-Body Interaction and the Case Against Occasionalism
by
Melissa Kalaee Gholamnejad

Claremont Graduate University: 2019

Fidelity to the Cartesian philosophy requires a defense of dualism as well as mind-body
union and interaction, all the while keeping to some form of the causal likeness principle. Each
of these positions are ones that Descartes maintained throughout his writings. Yet, successors
and scholars alike have noted the inconsistencies that arise from defending these views
conjointly and have argued that one or more of them should be abandoned. Even the first
generation of Cartesian successors whose fidelity to the Cartesian principles was especially
steadfast, such as Louis de la Forge, have been interpreted and characterized as giving up causal
interactionism and wittingly or unwittingly embracing occasionalism.
In my dissertation project, I have made mind-body not body-body cases the starting point
of the inquiry into cartesian causal interactionism and from there developed a general model of
interaction. This goes against the scholarly norm of focusing on the body-body cases to develop
a model that then cannot explain how the mind-body cases work. This is not a minor change in
point of view, but rather, requires a paradigm shift in cartesian studies, particularly with respect
to understanding mind-body union and interaction. Further supporting the needed paradigm shift
in our reading of La Forge is that in his account of union criteria we discover that mind-body
union is the true union and that body-body unions are considered such only by extension. As
such the case of mind-body union should be taken as the exemplar case and not body-body.

According to La Forge, mind and body are linked via the relative attribute of will and
share a relationship of mutual and reciprocal dependence. Union is not based on a spatial
relation. The union is a hybrid mode – a way of being of the two substances if and when they
stand in such a relation to one another. While, the union provides the commonality needed to
bridge the gap of what two distinct substances have in common it does not provide the
explanation of how mind and body interact. Operationalizing the union in terms of mutual and
reciprocal dependence requires further explanation.
La Forge explains that mind and body are secondary (particular) causes. The causal
model of interaction of mind and body is one in which these particular causes and their relation
of mutual and reciprocal dependence allows for the action of the one to bring about the effect in
the other. The body’s movements stimulate thoughts in the mind and the mind’s thoughts direct
movements in the body. There is a bi-directional causal interaction. Furthermore, by coupling
La Forge’s account of union and interaction with that of Nadler’s proposed occasional causation
model (not occasionalism) we find that mind and body both have causal agency in the weaker
secondary sense. Both substances have the power to determine and direct motion, albeit neither
mind nor body create motion per se. La Forge establishes a key distinction between universal
and particular causes, which then grounds his subsequent attribution of secondary causal power
to wills – to direct the movements of bodies, and to bodies in virtue of their modes of
configuration – to direct the movement of other bodies. While, God is the universal and efficient
cause that creates minds, bodies, and motion, He has minimal involvement in the particular
determinations of volitions and movements. He imparts power to His creatures to determine
motion (different than creating new motion ex nihil). God conserves the world and the laws set
by Him in the form of three laws of motion and seven laws of union. However, finite substances

such as mind and body also have force, albeit not in the same sense as God does as the universal
and total cause, but rather as particular secondary causes that have autonomy and can determine
the direction and local quantity of motion. Thus, La Forge explains how both mind-body and
body-body interactions are genuine causes, i.e., non-occasionalistic.
Accordingly, in keeping with Cartesian philosophy La Forge maintains dualism, and
provides an account of union and an account of interaction that is not occasionalistic. Both
mind-body and body-body interaction is based on equivocal causation – the effect does not
strictly resemble the cause – but both operate through the likenesses of relations of union, mutual
dependence and proximity respectively. Thus, La Forge’s causal model that has minds and
bodies interacting based on their relation of mutual and reciprocal dependence, and bodies
interacting based on their shared mutual proximity and dependence, provides a weaker account
of the causal likeness principle. Nonetheless, there is nothing inconsistent with his defense of a
weaker notion of likeness that does not demand resemblance. My examination of La Forge’s
Treatise on the Human Mind has demonstrated that we can maintain fidelity in our interpretation
of Descartes and the Cartesian philosophy that maintains its adherence to dualism while giving
an account of union and causal interaction.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Central Problems with Descartes’s Dualism
A cornerstone of Descartes’s philosophy is his mind-body substance dualism and the
argument he offers for the real distinction between them. Throughout the Meditations, Descartes
makes it abundantly clear that there “is a great difference between the mind and body, inasmuch
as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible.” 1 The
mind is a substance that thinks, and it has various ways, or modes of being, such as intellection,
doubt, understanding, and willing. Body or matter is a substance that is extended that has
“length, breadth and depth and is capable of various shapes and motions; moreover, these shapes
and motions are merely modes which no power whatever can cause to exist apart from the
body.”2 Both substances, mind and body, are separate such that “thought does not belong to the
nature of the body” and similarly extension and divisibility do not belong to the nature of the
mind – both exist independently. 3 There is a “real distinction” between mind and body, meaning
they can exist separately and independently of one another. The real distinction thesis gives rise
to a well-known problem in the literature referred to as the problem of causal interaction.
Descartes’s contemporaries raised concerns about the possibility of causal interaction
between mind and body, notably Pierre Gassendi (1592 – 1655) in the Fifth Objections &
Replies and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618 – 1680) in her correspondence with Descartes.
For how, by what means, can two things that share nothing in common causally interact?
In a letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 Descartes responds to his relative silence
on the matter:

1
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There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the knowledge we can
have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, the second is that being united to the body, it
can act and be acted upon along with it. About the second I have said hardly anything; I
have tried only to make the first well understood. For my principal aim was to prove the
distinction between the soul and the body, and to this end only the first was useful, and
the second might have been harmful. 4

Descartes explains that given his primary interest to usher in a new dualistic philosophy (away
from traditional scholastic thought), he privileged clear knowledge of the distinction of
substances as a more important goal than establishing less than clear knowledge of their union or
interaction. To this end he saw it prudent to emphasize their real distinction rather than their
union. To further explicate this point regarding certainty, Descartes in the same letter to Princess
Elizabeth discusses primitive notions. These notions are the building blocks of our conceptions.
These primary notions are few but used daily in our comprehension of things and these general
primitive notions are “of being, number, duration, etc.” 5 In regard to “body in particular, we
only have the notion of extension” and in regard to “the soul on its own, we have only the notion
of thought.”6 The notion of extension contains within it the notion of shape and motion.
Similarly, the notion of thought contains within it the notion of intellect and inclinations of the
will. In regard to “the soul and body together, we have only the notion of their union, on which
depends our notion of the soul’s power to move the body, and the body’s power to act on the
soul and cause its sensations and passions.” 7 Union is the notion that allows us to better
understand the concept of a united mind and body. The notion of extension entails shape and
motion, whereas the notion of union entails the soul’s power to move the body and the body’s
power to act on the soul resulting in sensations and passions. In order to have clear and distinct

4
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knowledge of mind as distinct from body, and not to confuse them, it is paramount to know what
notion belongs to what thing. Descartes writes;
I observe next that all human knowledge consists solely in clearly distinguishing these
notions and attaching each of them only to the things to which it pertains. For if we try to
solve a problem by means of a notion that does not pertain to it, we cannot help going
wrong.8

If we try to attach a notion to a thing to which it does not belong, we will be led into error. Most
errors are because we have applied the wrong notion to the wrong thing. An example of
applying a notion to a wrong thing is when, “we try to conceive the way in which the soul moves
the body by conceiving the way in which one body is moved by another.”9 We are in the wrong
when we try to apply the notions of how one body moves another body to the notion of how the
soul moves the body. In the same letter, Descartes continues;
So I think that we have hitherto confused the notion of the soul’s power to act on the
body with the power one body has to act on another. We have attributed both powers not
to the soul, for we did not yet know it, but to the various qualities of bodies such as
heaviness, heat, etc. 10
In order to avoid this error of misattribution, Descartes took time and care to establish the real
distinction thesis at the expense of the union and interaction theses. But this does not imply nor
mean that Descartes did not think that mind and body are united, or that they cannot interact. On
the contrary Descartes very much believed that mind and body are united, at least in the case of
the human being, and the result of this belief can be found especially in The Passions of the Soul.
The biggest lesson from the 21 May 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth is that in order to
understand how the soul moves the body, we cannot approach it as we would in understanding
how a body moves another body. Unfortunately, we do not get much else in the letter. Descartes

8
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never provides a clear account of the casual interaction between two substances. A similar
sentiment as above is found in Descartes’s last published work in The Passions of the Soul.11 In
part one, Descartes writes;
Next I note that we are not aware of any subject which acts more directly upon our soul
than the body to which it is joined. Consequently, we should recognize that what is a
passion in the soul is usually an action in the body. Hence there is no better way of
coming to know about our passions than by examining the difference between the soul
and the body, in order to learn to which of the two we should attribute each of the
functions present to us.12
In the case of the human being, the mind and body are joined. The passions of the soul bring
about actions in the body and the body acts directly on the soul, but in the interest of better
understanding our passions, first we must examine the difference between the soul and the body.
As stated in the 21 May 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth, in order to avoid error, we must first
understand what passions belong to the soul and which passions belong to the body. Descartes
asserts that soul and body are joined/united, and the body directly acts on the soul and the soul
acts on the body by bringing about action. However, as before, we are left without an
explanation of how mind and body, as two differing substances, are joined and interact with one
another.
According to Hoffman, in his article “The Unity of Descartes’s Man,” Descartes
deliberately provides little evidence in his writings for his stance on the union thesis. As
Hoffman points out in another letter to Regius, Descartes expresses his position for the lack of
union thesis in his work;13
… many more people make the mistake of thinking that the soul is not really distinct
from the body than make the mistake of admitting their distinction and denying their
substantial union, and in order to refute those who believe souls to be mortal it is more
important to teach the distinction of parts in man than to teach their union.
The Passions of the Soul was published in 1649 – six years after his letter to Princess Elizabeth.
CSM I 328
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In this particular letter Descartes is providing Regius with guidance on how to respond to
Scholastic critics, and to avoid any further problems.14 Since the goal is to respond to whether
humans are ens per accidens or ens per se, Descartes sees it as prudent to articulate the
distinction thesis and the immortality of the soul first and foremost than to make a case of the
union of mind (soul) and body. In the same letter to Regius, Descartes knowing that what he
writes is to address a Scholastic audience, acknowledges that thus far he has not openly denied
substantial forms and real qualities and he has merely argued that such qualities are not needed
“to explain the causes of natural things.” 15 Descartes, aware of his audience, knows that by not
utilizing the Scholastic doctrine it is equal to the denial of the Scholastic doctrine and he is ready
to reject substantial forms if pressed. Nevertheless, in pursuit of ushering in his new dualistic
philosophy Descartes uses Scholastic terminology to communicate this dualistic philosophy.
This includes an examination of human beings as ens per se or an ens per accidens. From the
same letter to Regius, Descartes’s writes,
When we said that a human being is an ens per accidens, we meant this only in relation
to its parts, the soul and body; we meant that for each of these parts it is in a manner
accidental for it to be joined to the other, because each subsist apart, and what can be
present or absent without the subject ceasing to exist is called an accident. But if a
human being is considered in himself as a whole, we say of course that he is a single ens
per se, and not per accidens; because the union which joins a human body and soul to
each other is not accidental to a human being, but essential, since a human being without
it is not a human being. 16

In the Scholastic doctrine to say something is an ens per se is to say that it is a substance.
However, for Descartes there is a corporeal substance and a thinking substance; they are united

“Regius, an exponent of Descartes’s views at the University of Utrecht, had offended his Aristotelian colleagues,
who led by Voetius, attempted to get the magistrates to forbid him to teach” (Hoffman, 1986, p. 345).
15
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but the result of this union, a human being, is not a substance. Nevertheless, to be a human is to
have a union of mind and body. Thus, it becomes crucial for Descartes to articulate the
distinction of substances and their modes since the debate with the Scholastic is on the grounds
of what is a substance and an accident.
To summarize, Descartes claims that: 1) mind and body are distinct substances, and 2) we
know that they are united (but, we do not know how they are united), and, 3) we know that the
mind and body interact i.e., the soul has the power to act upon the body and the body acts upon
the soul, and 4) we do not know how this interaction takes place, only that body-body interaction
is not the solution for understanding how this interaction takes place.
Yet, one more problem regarding causation has to be taken into consideration. In addition
to the real distinction argument of the Sixth Meditation, there is also Descartes’s claim that there
must be a kind of “likeness” or similarity between cause and effect. In the Third Mediation,
Descartes writes that, “…there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause
as in the effect of that cause.”17 Richard Watson draws two important consequences from this
likeness principle—one epistemological and the other causal. The most important for our
purpose here, is the claim about causal similarity (hereafter, the Causal Likeness Principle
(CLP)) and Descartes’s alleged inability to meet the condition of similarity, according to
Watson;
The major difficulties stem from the dualistic system of mind and matter in which the
ontological categories of substance and modification are exhaustive, and which included
epistemological and causal likeness principles. If the representation must be in some way
like the object represented, and the cause is some way like the effect, then the Cartesian
metaphysical system incorporates an unbridgeable gulf between mind and matter.18

17
18
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The worry, given that mental substances and physical substances share nothing in common, is
how a physical state can influence a mental state and vice versa? In addition, if they do affect
one another, in what way are they interacting? For example, when I voluntarily extend my leg,
how is my mind willing my body to move, and how is my body producing a sensation in the
mind when motions and sensations are wholly different?
It seems that if we are to maintain the dualism and the interactionism of the Cartesian
philosophy then CLP must be majorly revised or discarded. Simply put, the CLP demands that if
something (a cause) produces something else (an effect), then the effect must be like the cause in
some important way. However, it is not obvious how CLP operates or can operate in the case of
two differing substances (mind and body) as they share no substantial likeness. According to
Watson each thinker that contributed to Cartesian philosophy after Descartes fails at this project,
i.e., giving an account of interaction where there are two distinct substances. In order to
maintain the dualism and the causal interactionism that Descartes’s philosophy requires, Watson
concludes that CLP must be discarded. However, the only substitute for CLP would be to deny
natural necessity altogether and appeal to the omnipotence of God for all effects. According to
Watson, this is the sure road to occasionalism, the claim that only God is the true and efficient
cause, with no room for secondary or finite causes.
In agreement with Watson, Kenneth Clatterbaugh makes a case as to why Descartes’s
CLP must logically be abandoned:
Ultimately, Descartes’s likeness principle is abandoned for four quite different
reasons. The first we have only alluded to; namely, the causal likeness principle
unless it is greatly diluted does not help to explain how substances that are not
very much alike can interact. Examples would be God and extended things or
minds and matter. Second, one way the conflict of metaphysical principles can be
resolved is to abandon causation by the transfer of properties which provides a
major justification for the restricted causal likeness principle. In the case of
Rohault, having abandoned the justification, the tendency is to abandon the

7

principle. Third, Descartes’s second justification for the restricted causal likeness
principle fails because Cartesian physics fails; quantity of motion is not preserved,
as Malebranche and Leibniz both pointed out. And finally, Hume offers an
alternative analysis of causation which does not require, although it does allow
for, a similarity between cause and effect. 19

An initial but partial response to Watson and Clatterbaugh that will pave the way to
understanding La Forge’s response taken up in subsequent chapters, is that when we are
discussing union (and interaction) of mind and body we are discussing a particular body united
to a particular mind. We are not discussing the general substance of mind being united to the
general substance of body and looking for common modes in each. Of course, the suggestion that
the interaction is based on something common, but not common to one or the other substance per
se, demands an answer to the question how two different particular things, that belong to really
distinct substances, could have anything in common that permits the interaction. But the idea is
that it is possible to defend dualism and interactionism and honor CLP if we loosen the
requirements of the CLP (pace Watson).

1.2 Proposed Solutions to Dualism
It seems, then, that there are three paths taken to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent
triad of dualism, strict CLP, and interactionism. The first path is to maintain substance dualism
and strict CLP and abandon interactionism, as Watson and Clatterbaugh argue Descartes is
logically committed to. The second path retains a strict CLP but eliminates substance dualism
(and hence any difficulties with interactionism). The third path, less clear than the first two,
modifies CLP making room for dualism and interactionism (pace Watson).

19
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A number of Descartes’s contemporaries pursue these paths, which merits some
examination and evaluation. In the process of this review, I argue that 1) in order to retain
substance dualism and strict CLP, Watson and Clatterbaugh are correct that the interaction thesis
must be abandoned, as we see in Malebranche; 2) in order to retain strict CLP and
interactionism, dualism must be abandoned, as we see in Leibniz and Spinoza; and 3) if one
wants to keep causal interaction between two distinct substances then the strict CLP must be
modified, as we will see in La Forge.
1) Maintain Dualism + strict CLP = Occasionalism
Nicolas Malebranche (1638 – 1715) holds the first position. Malebranche defends dualism, keeps
strict CLP, and eliminates interactionism, thus making a case for occasionalism. Malebranche
states:
As I understand it, a true cause is one in which the mind perceives a necessary connection
between cause and its effect. Now, it is only in an infinitely perfect being that one
perceives a necessary connection between its will and its effects. Thus God is the only
true cause, and only he truly has the power to move bodies. I further say that it is not
conceivable that God could communicate to men or angels the power he has to move
bodies…20
For Malebranche, it is God alone who has the power to perceive necessary connections and
thereby to produce effects in substances. The human mind cannot perceive necessary
connections between things, nor does it have the power to move bodies. For example, if a billiard
ball strikes another billiard ball and it moves, the striking billiard ball provides the occasion for
which God wills to move the billiard ball that is struck. Likewise, if on the occasion of certain
motions in my body, I feel hunger, then the connection is produced by God directly. Thus,
embracing a strict dualism and CLP entails abandoning the true causal interaction of things. The
true interaction is between God and created things, not between created things.

20
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2. Maintain strict CLP + Interactionism = Monism (denial of dualism)
Spinoza (1632 – 1677) and Leibniz (1646 – 1716) choose variants of the second option. Both
abandoned substance dualism in favor of adherence to strict CLP and a somewhat trivial
interactionism. Spinoza, unhappy with the consequences of Descartes’s dualism, eliminated
finite mind and body as substances making them attributes of one, infinite substance. Mind and
body, as modes of the same substance (God) could interact by their nature, consistent with strict
CLP. Problems arise for Spinoza later down the line with his doctrine of parallelism—but these
are not relevant to his stance on monism, CLP, and interactionism. Leibniz similarly unhappy
with Descartes’s dualism, argued that there is only one kind of substance—simple, infinite,
extensionless monads—and that minds and bodies are composites arising out of a singular
substance. Thus for Leibniz, like Spinoza, there is no problem of interaction between substances
because they are all of the same kind. Like Spinoza’s parallelism, however, Leibniz faces
scrutiny for his doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. How finite bodies interact with bodies, and
finite minds with bodies, is a matter for the laws of interaction pre-established by God.
Nonetheless, what is relevant here is that in both Spinoza and Leibniz strict CLP is observed as
minds and bodies share the same substantial nature, grounding their “interaction,” but dualism is
abandoned.
3. Maintain Dualism + Interactionism = revision of CLP
Finally, those who attempt the third path, a reconciliation of the three theses, had to dispense
with a strict adherence to CLP. These are the so-called Orthodox (non-occasionalist) Cartesians,
a term coined by Watson in his book The Downfall of Cartesianism.21 Such thinkers, according

Watson coined the term orthodox Cartesians referring to non-occasionalist Cartesian ideas, “these philosophers
who do not offer occasionalist solutions to Cartesian problems are referred to as orthodox Cartesians…They retained
the strict dualism between mind and matter, and thus could explain interaction only by dispensing with the causal
21
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to Watson, included Robert Desgabets (1610 – 1678), Jacques Rohault (1620 – 1672), Pierre
Sylvain Régis (1632 – 1707), Antoine Le Grand (1629 1699), Antoine Arnauld (1612 – 1694),
and finally Louis de La Forge (1632 – 1666).22 Orthodox Cartesians keep to a strict dualistic
stance but according to Watson each must abandon his adherence to strict CLP in order to
account for the interaction between mind and body. I agree with Watson’s argument thus far.
For example, Desgabets dispenses with CLP and states that interaction is one of “God’s
mysteries.”23 We acquire knowledge of soul, body and union through the natural light (our use of
the faculty of reason). But ultimately God is the authority in charge of establishing the laws of
the interaction between mind and body. Likewise, Régis held the view that CLP is at odds with
the more basic Cartesian dualistic philosophy. His conclusion was that “while interaction
between bodies can be explained by reason in the order of nature, interaction and knowing
between spirit and body are events in the order of grace which can be ‘explained’ (i.e., accepted)
only by faith.”24 The union of mind and body is not based on the essence of mind and body but
made possible by the of grace of God. Schmaltz argues for Desgabets’ and Regis’ account of
real secondary causes and causal interaction but, concludes that the account falls short of their
goals. Lennon has argued that Desgabets’ account of the individuation of bodies and minds
commits him to the view that mind-body union is ideal and not real. (1994)
Recently, scholars have distinguished the problem of union from the problem of
interaction. Paul Hoffman rightly notes that although related, the solution to the union problem

likeness principle. Concurrently, in order to contend that mind could know matter which was utterly different from
it, they also had to deny the epistemological likeness principle” (Watson, 1966, p. 64).
22
Although some scholars have objected arguing that some of the orthodox Cartesians are occasionalists.
23
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24
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does not give us a solution to the interaction problem. As Hoffman states in his article “The
Unity of Descartes’s Man,”:
It is this problem of the nature of the union between mind and body, as opposed to the
problem of their interaction, which is the subject of this paper. Moreover, I do not wish
to discuss the nature of the union of mind and body with respect to its success in solving
the problem of mind-body interaction. 25

In his examination of the union problem, he argues for a kind of trialism, or pluralism, of
substances.26 It seems that Hoffman takes a pseudo fourth path by acknowledging dualism while
making a case for the union of mind and body as a third kind of substance. 27 Daisie Radner also
promotes a clear separation of the discussion on union and interaction. According to Radner, the
union is a primary notion for Descartes, and as such, is not reducible any further and does not
provide the solution to the “interaction problem.” Radner writes,
Thus Descartes’ notion of the union of mind and body arises in response to the problem
of how the mind and the body can causally interact. Since the union of mind and body is
meant to account for the possibility of interaction between the mind and the body, it
cannot in turn be explained in terms of that interaction. 28

I agree with both Radner and Hoffman that the union thesis is distinct from an account for the
causal interaction. Accounts of both union and interaction are needed in order to address the
challenges one must face by accepting Cartesian dualism and interactionism. Since the two
substances are fundamentally different in kind, they would seem to lack commonality that would
allow them to interact. As Spinoza states in Proposition III of the Ethics, “things which have
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nothing in common cannot be one of the causes of the other.”29 Claiming that mind (in
particular) and body (in particular) are both finite substances is not enough commonality to
provide the needed foundation for causal interaction.
Nonetheless, the union thesis does provide the commonality needed to lay the foundation
for the explanation of how two differing substances causally interact. As noted above, Hoffman
is only interested in this commonness (the union thesis) between the mind substance and body
substance. He does not take on the discussion of causal interaction. According to Hoffman then,
the two substance are united based on a relationship of inherence, “…things which can exist
apart from each other can form an ens per se, provided that they stand in appropriate relation to
one another. And all agree that the relation in question is the inherence relation.” 30 For Hoffman,
the commonality between the two differing substances, mind and body, is the shared relationship
of inherence. For Hoffman the union of two “distinct things, mind and body, can somehow
generate another thing, the man or a human being, which is itself a unity, that is, a genuine or an
ens per se.”31 The union that is formed between mind and body produces a third thing, and in
order for a human being to exist it (the man) must be united to a mind. Since, this union is based
on a relationship of inherence but (not based on each substance containing the essential attributes
of the other substance), the “real distinction” between mind and body is based only on a modal
distinction.32 But if Hoffman is right, then real distinction, and Cartesian substance dualism
itself, must be abandoned.
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Gideon Manning, in an unpublished work titled “Does Descartes Believe We Are Just
‘Straddling Modes’?”, further drives the point that Hoffman is making by stating “that there
exists a mode that can be viewed from two perspectives and that the causation that exists
between two substances results from a single numerically identical effect manifesting
simultaneously in both mind and body.” 33 Manning reaches this conclusion based on the action
and passion dynamic that Descartes presents in his work Passions of the Soul. According to
Manning, Descartes regards action and passion “as a single numerically identical mode in two
otherwise really distinct substances.”34 The union then, what two differing substances have in
common, is between modes – the union of mind substance with a particular human body (a
mode). Manning states that the existence of a human being is its dependence or union to the
mind substance. The suggestion that the commonality the union provides between two differing
substances (mind and body) is between their modes has potential; however, Manning is asserting
that the mode of body is a mode of the mind (substance) and a mode of matter (substance). This
is essentially a kind of modal identity that we see in Spinoza’s parallelism. On this account, if an
individual has the thought ‘I want to raise my arm’ it will instantly be followed by the arm being
raised. However, there is no direct causal connection between the mental event (thought of
raising arm) and the physical event (I raise my arm). 35 If body in particular (as a mode of body
substance) is also a mode of a thinking substance then there is no need for a causal connection.
This makes the claim that 1) union of mind and body is based on their modes but not modes that
are intermingling with one another from two different substances but rather each substance
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individually has the same mode (in this case the mode of body in particular); 2) there is no causal
connection and as such there is no interaction. It is unclear if this is a point that Descartes would
encourage based on his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, in which he insists that mind
and its modes are different than body and its modes. Even if we grant that we have built
commonality between the two different substances by giving an account of union, this assertion
will not suffice because we do not have an account of real causal interaction between mind and
body.
Yet another option similar to the one Hoffman takes but which does not advocate for
either a union or interaction thesis, can be found in John Cottingham’s article “Cartesian
Trialism”. Cottingham asserts that there are features that belong to the mind alone, the body
alone, and features that belong to the united human being alone. These latter features are
sensation and imagination. 36 These faculties do not quite belong to the mind alone or the body
alone; thus, we must have a third category that accounts for these faculties. According to
Cottingham, a third category along with the already established dualistic account would, improve
the Cartesian philosophy. But as Cottingham himself admits, the notion of a third category of
substance is not something Descartes himself advocated, nor is it a notion that subsequent
Cartesian thinkers promoted. Moreover, it has the pitfalls of Hoffman’s account which violates
Descartes’s real distinction and substance dualism.
There are other scholars who take on the discussion of interaction (leaving aside issues of
the nature of the union) and posit an occasionalistic reading of Descartes, at least in the case of
body-body interaction. For example, Garber suggests that according to Descartes, “when I
examine the idea of body, I perceive that it has no power [vis] in itself through which it can
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produce or conserve itself.”37 Then God, through what Garber calls the impulse view, gives a
kind of push or impulse to objects to bring about movement/motion in objects. While he is
willing to acknowledge that there are some finite causes in the world, like minds, Garber argues
for an occasionalistic view in regard to inanimate objects. Similarly, Hatfield in his article,
“Forces (God) in Descartes’ Physics” discusses ‘force’ in Descartes’s texts and states that
Descartes is an occasionalist (in that God is doing all the work) in the case of body-body
interaction. Hatfield writes,
Thus in order to preserve the same quantity of motion in the face of constant contact
among the various particles, God is eternally giving one particle more motion and another
particle less, according to their size and speed, in the manner described by the three laws
of motion.38

With regard to mind→body cases, Hatfield holds the view that human minds, as well as angels,
can act on matter and can be “considered to have an ‘extension of power’” on objects. 39
The premise behind this position is that the passivity of matter and lack of ‘force’ in
matter that Nadler, Garber, and Hatfield emphasize, leads to occasionalism for Cartesian
philosophy, at least for the case of body-body interaction. However, it should be noted that the
approaches (either discussion of union alone or interaction alone) pursued by scholars follow a
path that Descartes advised would lead to error. As noted earlier, if we are to understand the
mind and body union and their interaction it would be a mistake if we were to start with bodybody cases, and then based on those findings apply it to the mind-body cases. Thus, I propose a
paradigm shift in our approach to understanding causal interaction. Instead of beginning with
body-body cases, which will naturally lead us to occasionalism (because matter is agreed by all
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hands to be passive) we should begin by evaluating mind-body cases, and then see if we can
construct a general model that may apply to body-body cases. This is one of many reasons that
influenced my selection of Louis de la Forge as the thinker to examine for this dissertation, as
this is the approach he takes. Scholars have noted La Forge’s non-occasionalist approach to
mind-body interaction but also have generally interpreted him as taking an occasionalist stance
to body-body cases. What scholars have not taken note of, however, is the order of La Forge’s
examination: he begins with the mind-body cases and then proceeds to the body-body cases. If
my suggestion is correct, we will learn from following the order of his argument in the text,
develop a general causal model, and use this to assist in the interpretation of the body-body
cases, which I grant use occasionalist language. 40

1.3 Preview of La Forge’s Solution to Solving the Dualistic Puzzle
In La Forge’s Treatise on the Human Mind, he first discusses the union and interaction of
mind and body, then moves on to the question of passivity of matter, and ultimately, the cases of
body-body interaction. Little has been written on La Forge, and that which has been written
attributes an occasionalistic reading to his work, with a focus on body-body interaction. Nadler
carefully distinguishes the case of body-body interaction from body-mind interaction in his book,
Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians:
while denying that bodies have moving force might commit you to occasionalism in
body-body case, it certainly does not commit you to occasionalism in the body-mind
case, particularly if you grant that the soul has an active power to produce its own ideas. 41
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This very conclusion is what Nadler applies to La Forge’s work. Nadler writes, “La Forge adopts
this schema of Descartes [remote (occasional cause) for the body and proximate (efficient cause)
for the mind]. It is not occasionalism – it is occasional causation, which, for La Forge, is a
secondary but real causal relation.”42 The aim of the chapters to come is to evaluate the
following received view: that we must be an occasionalist in regard to body-body cases and an
interactionist in regard to mind-body cases. I will begin with the evaluation of mind-body cases
first then move to body-body cases.
To state another way, according to the received scholarly view, Louis de la Forge is an
occasionalist, certainly with respect to body-body interaction, with the possible exception of
mind-body interaction, if not a full occasionalist. There is evidence to support this reading in La
Forge’s Treatise on the Human Mind, specifically passages in chapter 16. However, to make the
claim that La Forge is an occasionalist is to ignore the entire context of the Treatise. In exploring
the earlier chapters and the remaining chapters of the Treatise, I argue that La Forge is clearly
not an occasionalist in regard to mind-body union and interaction. Furthermore, the causal
interaction between mind and body is bi-directional. If this is correct, if bodies can act on minds,
then this calls into question why bodies could not act on other bodies. My hypothesis is that a
solution that is offered up by La Forge on the union and interaction thesis might be applied
fruitfully to body-body interaction while maintaining that the general causal account is not
occasionalist, but rather conservationist. An occasionalist appeals to God as the one true cause of
all events in the world; a conservationist appeals to natural causes while keeping divine
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intervention to a minimum. I explain more fully the occasionalist v. conservationist debate in the
final chapter.43
I argue that La Forge is not an occasionalist for a multitude of reasons. As a steadfast
Cartesian, he intends to maintain dualism and give an explanation of union and interaction. For
example, La Forge provides us with the criteria of what should be considered a true union; bodybody cases do not meet these criteria, and as such should not be used as the exemplar case for
mind-body union. La Forge makes a case for particular causes. Union and interaction of mind
and body is based on a relation of reciprocal and mutual dependence.
The order La Forge proceeds in is important to gather the general argument of The
Treatise on the Human Mind. According to La Forge, an account of union must be established
first, because it is a necessary condition to then discuss causal interaction between two differing
substances. An account of union allows the discussion of causal interaction because the union
provides what two substances have in common. However, beyond their commonality, the union
thesis does not provide us with an account of causal interaction. Thus, we need both an account
of union, what two differing substances have in common and an account of interaction, how the
two differing substances interact. The goal of subsequent chapters is to take on and evaluate the
metaphysical question, the causal problem, and the occasionalistic stance that has been attributed
to La Forge and by extension to Descartes.
In Chapter Two I will discuss what it means for two things to be united, and more
specifically, the criteria they must fulfill in order to be considered a true union. I will then show
that two differing substances, mind and body, can be united and their union is based on the
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relationship of mutual dependence. Furthermore, a union based on relations cannot be
occasionalistic for the simple reason that if God was solely responsible for all the work, we
would not require mutual dependence between mind and body. Followed by a demonstration of
why we should take what La Forge offers on the union criterion seriously. Using an analytical
tool called Voyant I will show that La Forge’s Treatise and its union thesis is inspired by
Descartes’s Regulae text (an unpublished text of Descartes’ that remained to be unpublished
during La Forge’s lifetime). More specifically using Collocates, Correlations, Context, in
Voyant Tools to demonstrate target pairs ‘relative attributes’ and ‘mutual dependence’ often
appear together (both terminology from Descartes) and are found in Descartes’s Regulae.
In Chapter Three I will discuss the interaction of mind and body. I will demonstrate that
this interaction is invoked by the relations of mutual dependence and follows the laws of union
which are founded on the action and passion dynamic. I will show that the interaction is bidirectional according to La Forge. I will also explicate the four cases of aversion that La Forge
offers in assessing the action/passion dynamic as an explanation for causal interaction.
Moreover, the causal interaction is not based on occasionalism because there is a bi-directional
causal story – mind-body interaction and body-mind interaction.
Finally, in Chapter Four I will address the question of how and if the body-body
interaction fits the proposed model of mind-body interaction. Can the same relational
connections that are invoked for mind-body interaction also be invoked in body-body cases?
According to La Forge, the body-body cases have the relation of proximity and follow the three
laws of motion and, while motion stays constant, bodies can determine the direction of their
movement. This suggests that bodies have some causal role in the movement of other bodies. I
will review Nadler’s occasional causation (different than occasionalism), La Forge’s stance for
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conservationism, and determine if it applies to body-body cases or if body-body cases are
doomed to fall under the occasionalistic stance, as has been suggested by scholars.
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Chapter 2 – La Forge on the Union Thesis

2.1 Introduction to the problem of causal interaction

As we saw in the previous chapter, Descartes famously argues for substance dualism in
the Sixth Meditation when he states that “I am really distinct from my body, and can exist
without it.” However, a few paragraphs later, Descartes also claims that the mind and body are
intimately united, not merely as “a sailor is present in a ship”, but “intermingled with it, so that I
and the body form a unit.”44 The problem that arises when we try to make sense of these two
doctrines is called the “unity problem”. The “unity problem” raises the question of how two
distinct substances, mind and body, can be intermingled in a way that is consistent with
Cartesian substance dualism. Substance-based solutions to the problem of unity have tended to
compromise Descartes’s substance dualism in the direction of monism, trialism, or pluralism.
Moreover, non-substance-based accounts of the union have tended to trivialize the union by
treating it as accidental, reducible or eliminable.
Contemporary philosophers of mind, such as Jaegwon Kim and Paul Audi, who are
interested in understanding mental causation, discuss the ‘pairing problem.’ The pairing problem
is typically understood as posing a major problem for Cartesian dualism:45
The pairing problem appears to show that part of the explanation of why any given thing
stands in the causal relations it does will be that it stands in certain spatial relations to its
cause and effects. Since Cartesian dualism denies that mental substances enter into spatial
relations, Cartesians are at pains to deny this. 46
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Audi points out that the pairing problem assumes that the “pairing relation is a metaphysical
precondition of causation.”47 But then he goes on to explain that, “I will give reason to doubt that
such a pairing relation exists in all cases of causal interaction, even among physical things, and
reason to doubt that the presence of a pairing relation is a metaphysical precondition of
causation.”48 In other words, Audi has reason to reject the assumption upon which the pairing
problem arises, namely, that spatial relations are necessary for all causal interaction. Another
way of putting this, that is friendly to Cartesian terms, is as follows: even if body-body
interaction requires proximity, it does not follow that all interactions involving the body, or the
mind require proximity. Might there be some other relation or set of relations that underlie
different kinds of causal interactions?

2.1.1 The Cartesian Problem of Causal Interaction
For the Cartesian, there are three sorts of causal interaction, and occasionalism was not
proposed as an ad hoc solution to the mind-body interaction problem. 49 Other forms of
interaction also require explanation: body-body, mind-body, and mind-mind. The so-called
Orthodox Cartesians, successors to Descartes, posited three different laws of interaction to
account for these different sorts.50 Louis de la Forge is not generally considered an Orthodox
Cartesian because of his alleged occasionalism or partial occasionalism. 51 Yet, La Forge defends
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cartesian dualism, the union of mind and body, and causal interaction between mind and body,
which is importantly relevant for Watson’s criteria for Orthodox Cartesianism. In his Treatise on
the Human Mind La Forge’s aim is to,
…remove from many people’s minds the unfortunate tendency to believe that unless their
soul were corporeal, it would not have the power to move the body because, they say, it
could not do so without touching it … as if motion could be communicated only by
impact or as if it were as easy to perceive how one body could move another as it is to see
how it touches it. 52

Commentators often cite passages on body-body interaction in Chapter 16 of Treatise on the
Human Mind as hard evidence of La Forge’s occasionalism.53 These commentators take bodybody interaction as the paradigm, i.e., as a simple and exemplary case of interaction. The simple
case is understood as the interaction of the same substance, namely, body-body and perhaps
mind-mind interaction. Building from these simple cases scholars have then applied these same
rules to the composite or complex case of mind-body—complex because it involves the
interaction of two different substances. What is discovered by body-body or mind-mind
interaction would then serve as the paradigmatic case to model the mind-body case. Once the
body-body case is established as the interaction paradigm, it is an easy task for scholars to apply
the same logic to the body-mind case: matter is essentially passive and cannot bring about
change or movement in anything—body or mind. Thus established, scholars then reason that all
interaction must come from the will of God. This train of reasoning, therefore, establishes
occasionalism as the solution for the Cartesian mind-body union and interaction problems.
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Other scholars are more willing to acknowledge the volitional powers of the will, but find
La Forge’s account incoherent or incomplete, and default to the position that the body-body case
is the paradigm for causation in La Forge.54 However, as I hope to demonstrate with the aid of
textual evidence from La Forge’s Treatise on the Human Mind (1666), these alleged
paradigmatic cases are not true unions and consequently should not be understood as the
paradigm for causal interaction cases.55 As such, I argue that scholars have taken the wrong
approach in trying to treat mind-body interaction as modelled on body-body or mind-mind
interaction. Nevertheless, in order to consider interaction of mind-body we must first examine
how two distinct substance can be united. The establishment of a true union will provide the
commonality needed to account for how two distinct things are united. This in turn will set up
the foundation needed to construct an explanation of interaction between two distinct things.
In this chapter, I explore La Forge’s solutions to the problem of mind-body unity. La
Forge offers a promising non-substance-based account in which the union, or basis of
interaction, consists in the mutual dependence of the actions of the mind and the motions of the
body. This mutual dependence consists in a special relation that allows for the unity of entities
like mental substance and physical substance that have no-spatial relations in common. In other
words, I will attempt to demonstrate how it is for La Forge that the first approach suggested by
Audi that, “non-spatial pairing relations” are possible between non-physical and physical
entities.56 I will show that the union of mind and body is the true union and thus the proper
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model or exemplar for all causal interactions. The existence of this “true union,” is, “speaking
generally, that the union of a mind and body consists in a mutual and reciprocal dependence of
thoughts of one of them on the movements of the other, and in the mutual interaction of their
actions and passions…”57 Nonetheless, the challenge La Forge faces, as does Descartes, is to
explain how the mind-body union is not itself a substance, yet can possess a true union that
serves as the basis for the causal interaction of the mind and body. Furthermore, using the
analytical tool Voyant (providing new quantitative evidence) couple with historical evidence I
will demonstrate why we should take La Forge’s stance on the union thesis seriously by making
a case that La Forge is influenced by an unpublished text of Descartes, the Regulae.

2.2 La Forge on kinds of union: a mutual and reciprocal dependence relation
In Replies to the sixth Objections and Replies Descartes identifies two ways of
characterizing a union. And the way in which we come to have an idea of each one of those two
different things and their union is either through the “unity or identity of their nature, or else
merely in respect of unity of composition.” 58 Unity of nature refers to being able to perceive the
same substances with all its modes and recognize that it is all part of the same substance. For
example, “that which has shape and that which is mobile are one and the same in virtue of a
unity of nature.”59 The same can be said of the thinking substance. The thing that understands
and wills I perceive as being part of the same substance – mental substance. However, my
perception is different “in the case of the thing that we consider under the form of bone and that
which we consider under the form of flesh.” 60 We cannot have the perception of a human being
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in virtue of its nature because a human being is not composed of the same substance. Rather, a
human being is a composition of both corporeal and mental substance. Descartes writes,
Thus, however often we find them in one and the same subject – e.g. when we find
thought and corporeal motion in the same man – we should not therefore think that they
are one and the same in virtue of a unity of nature, but should regard them as the same
only in respect of unity of composition. 61

Since mind and body substances are different and I observe these differences between them,
none the less I perceive them both in the same subject. I am not perceiving them based on the
virtue of their nature but rather in the case of human being, I perceive them based on their unity
of composition. Finally, in a letter to Regius, on January 1642 Descartes writes,
But if a human being is considered in himself as a whole, we say of course that he is a
single ens per se, and not per accidens; because the union which joins a human body and
soul to each other is not accidental to a human being, but essential, since a human being
without it is not a human being. But many more people make the mistake of thinking that
the soul is not really distinct from the body than make the mistake of admitting their
distinction and denying their substantial union, and in order to refute those who believe
souls to be mortal it is more important to teach the distinctness of parts in a human being
than teach their union. 62
In the above letter Descartes is offering guidance to Regius in how to respond to denial of
substantial forms. In the beginning of the letter Descartes writes,
…why did you need to reject openly substantial forms and real qualities? Do you
not remember that on page 64 of my Meteorology, I said quite expressly that I did
not at all reject or deny them, but simply found them unnecessary in setting out
my explanations? 63

Descartes does deny the substantial forms and even though scholars such as Paul Hoffman in his
earlier work, “The Unity of Descartes’s Man” attempt to make a case that Descartes did really
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mean to push forward the notion of a substantial union between mind and body by stating that, “I
take him [Descartes] to be pointing out not merely that the union is a union of two substances,
which he does this is the case, but that the product of the union is itself a substance.” 64
Nevertheless the aim of the letter cannot be denied when Descartes writes statements such as,
“whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give that you believe that a
human being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per accidens…” and if “Voetius asks whether
the denial of substantial forms can be reconciled with Holy Scripture…” Descartes is coaching
Regius on how to respond appropriately to those who have Scholastic assumptions. Descartes
gives direction to Regius by using Scholastic terminology such as, the term substantial union, to
avoid further controversy. The above examples showcase that Descartes held the notion of the
union. But in the Objections and Replies he is merely telling us how we have an idea (or how
we have a perception) of a union of two differing substances and in the letter to Regius he is
offering guidance on how to respond to the Scholastic using Scholastic terminology. In either
example he is not proving how the mind and body are united. This is why it is crucial to turn to
the Cartesians that came after Descartes death since, thinkers like La Forge were not embroiled
in the same battles with the Scholastic philosophy and may have been freer to offer solutions to
the Cartesian problems.
As such, La Forge first provides us with a recapping of what the union is not,
1) let us reject first of all the idea of any kind of local presence or at least let us try to
think of it without any extension, real or virtual. 65
2) let us take care not to convince ourselves that this union, however close it may be,
transforms these two substances into a simple substance and the mind thereby becomes
material or the body is spiritualized.
3) they both remain after the union what they were before it, and they are no less two
substances which retain everything which distinguished them from each other from the
point of view of their absolute being.
64
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4) let us not think that this union is realized by means of whatever makes them opposite
and by what they are in an absolute sense. It is much more likely that it is realized by
something in which they have some relation, resemblance or mutual dependence. 66
Then according to La Forge, the union is not based on a spatial (physical) standing, the union
does not bring about a third simple substance, dualism is kept even if we have union, and finally
the union is not based on the fact that they are just two separate (opposing) substances. But rather
the union is based on some kind of relation.
Mind and body are united via their modes which is a way of being based on their
relations. La Forge writes,
There are others even among Mr Descartes’s followers who are convinced that the union
of mind and body is realized by a certain mode which they call a union, which serves as
some kind of link to cement to join the two substances. I have this to say to them, that if
they do not think that this mode is something distinct from the mind and body, they are
not saying anything which is inconsistent with what we shall propose shortly. For who
does not recognize that when the body and mind are united, they are in a mode which is
different from when they are not, and that this union is therefore a mode or way of being
in relation to both of them? 67

Then, a mode is a way of being. The union of mind and body is a mode (a way of being). A
different mode than those found simply in mind or body substances, I will call this a hybrid
mode. Such a mode is unique to the union and only emerges from the union of mind and body.
For example, the modes that occur because we are human beings (not just bodies, or not just
minds) include appetites such as hunger and thirst, sensations such as color and heat, and
emotions such as love and hate. Before going any deeper and to stave off any confusion, Figure 1
illustrates what is to come and be discussed based on La Forge’s stance on union:

66
67

Numbers 2-4 are from Treatise 120
Treatise 119

29

Action
Figure 1
Action/Passion
dynamic based on
mutual and reciprocal
dependence

Mind

Body
Union (a way of
being): linked by
relative attribute
of will.

Passion

In general, for something to even be considered as a union or what La Forge calls a true
union it must fulfill two criteria. I will call this the union criteria. A union is fulfilled when there
is,
some kind of relation, resemblance, or dependence by means of which we consider two
things as in some sense constituting only one … [and] every kind of union implies two
things which are distinct from each other.68
In order for something to be identified as a union it must: 1) share a relation, resemblance, or
dependence which allows two things to be considered as one; and 2) exist between two things
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that are distinct from each other. La Forge considers four potential candidates for true union
before landing on one. A union between two things could be between: a) substance-substance,
b) substance-essential attributes, c) substance-mode, and d) mode-mode.69 La Forge writes, “I
even think that when we look at it more closely these last three kinds of unions do not deserve
the name”— i.e., the name of union in a true sense.70 Hence, the relationships expressed in b-d,
substance-essential attributes, substance-mode, and mode-mode, do not deserve the name of a
true union. In the case of substance-essential attribute and substance-mode these are “only the
same thing as the substance – no more than a union between modes or attributes which occur
together in the same simple subject [single substance].”71 The relationship of substance,
attribute, and mode in Cartesian philosophy is that a mode depends on the attribute and an
attribute depends on a substance. I cannot have knowledge of the substance without knowing its
attributes, but I can know a substance without knowing its modes. When we say a substance is
united by way of its essential attributes all we are saying is that the attribute allows us to know
that substance. Attributes make substances understandable to the human mind. For example,
when we claim to know thinking substance it is because we know its essential attribute –
thought. Similarly, when we say to know extended substance, it is because we know its essential
attribute – extension in breadth, length, and depth. Knowing the essential attribute of a substance
allows us to have knowledge of that substance. Thus, the linkage between substance-essential
attribute is not a true union because, we are just talking about the same substance and the second
part of the union criterion is not met – i.e., a union of two distinct things. In a similar fashion the
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linkage between substance-mode is not a true union because just like the case of essential
attribute we can say we know something about the attribute by knowing the mode. For example,
an idea is a mode of thinking and thought/thinking is the essential attribute of a thinking
substance. The shape of a rock is a mode of the attribute extension (length, breadth, depth).
Substance-mode relations allow us to say something specific about the substance, but they are
not different in substance. For example, I can talk about the position and motion (modes) of a
stone (extended substance) but we are still considering the same substance. Hence, the
substance-mode relation does not meet the second part of the union criterion and as such it
cannot constitute a true union. In the case of mode-mode relation, it suffers the same failure as b
and c. In Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy, he states that there are modes of the same single
substance that can be differentiated. 72 For example, we can distinguish a stone’s shape from its
size and texture. Nonetheless, we must realize that they are just modes of the same substance,
i.e., extended substance. Size, shape, and texture are different modes of extended substance that
do not meet the second criterion of the union thesis and so d) mode-mode unions are not
considered as true unions.73
Recall that according to La Forge, a true union must satisfy two criteria: 1) share a
relation, resemblance, or dependence which allows two things to be considered as one; and 2)
exist between two things that are distinct from each other. The joining of body-body (same
substance) and mind-mind (same substance) does not constitute true union for La Forge because
they are not distinct substances and do not meet the second part of the union criterion. Only a)
the union of two different substances, body and mind, fulfills the two criteria for true union.
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In regard to the first part of the union criterion, a union implies some kind of relation,
resemblance, or mutual dependence, La Forge examines each feature respectively. Relations
“hold between things” and it is relations that capture the origin and termini of the actions and
passions.74 Knowing the relation allows us to know how two things can be united into a single
thing, at least in the sense of being able to comprehend such things.75 According to La Forge the
types of relations we can have are threefold: relations of affirmation, relations of negation,
and relations of origin.76 Relations of affirmation refer to the resemblance between two things.
According to La Forge,
The resemblance which should marry a body and mind must therefore be found in their
respective properties, that is, in their operations and in the fact that they are capable of
acting and being acted on. That is the only way in which one could say that a substance
could unite with another, enter into the other or receive it into itself. 77

The relation of affirmation that founds the first condition of a true union, namely the
resemblance between mind and body, consists, “in their operations and in the fact that they are
capable of acting and being acted on.” More must be said about the action-passion relation in the
union of mind and body, but for now it is enough to know that La Forge sees action-passion as a
relation of affirmation that fulfills the first condition of a true union.
The second relation, the relation of negation, cannot be the relation that unites mind and
body because,
…since it is a relation of contrast or differences based on the diversity of the things which
are contrasted, it is obvious that it is incapable of uniting them and that we should not
look to this type of relation for the basis of the union of mind and body. 78
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La Forge only gives us this brief reasoning as to why union of mind and body cannot be the
relation of negation, but it is clear he thinks that negation is a “relation of contrast or differences
based on the diversity of the things,” and is “incapable of uniting them.” La Forge seeks a
foundation for mind-body union that is close enough that it is not lost during lethargy, ecstasy,
sleep, and deep meditation. However, the relation of affirmation alone is not enough to provide
the union. In addition to affirmation, La Forge argues that the mind-body union also requires the
relation of origin. The relation of origin is a relation of cause and effect, which allows mind and
body to depend on each other mutually: “that is, the actions of the body would cause the mind to
be acted on and the actions of the mind would cause the body to be acted on.” 79 The union then
is based on both the relation of affirmation and the relation of origin. Union of mind and body is
based on the relation of action and passion (relation of affirmation) and the mutual and reciprocal
dependence (relation of origin).
Furthermore, La Forge tells us that something is related to another by way of their
absolute/essential attributes or by their relative attributes.80 He writes,
But it is obvious that the relation which unites two things is not a resemblance between
them in virtue of their essential attributes. For although all bodies are similar insofar as
they are extended, shaped and mobile, they are not however all united. The union of all
things which are united must be sought, therefore, in their relative or respective
attributes.81

The relation that allows for two things to be composed and considered as one thing is founded in
their relative/respective attributes. These relative attributes in general are established from the
action and passion dynamic that the two substances share. La Forge informs us of this when he
writes,
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I find none by which two bodies, two minds, or a body and a mind could have some
relation, resemblance or dependence apart from, firstly and in general, action and passion,
for every kind of being and in every kind of union because, among all the respective
[relative] attributes, they alone go out from their subjects and can become attached to
others.82

Two things to note here: 1) the action-passion relation is one that La Forge sees in all
interactions, including mind-body, body-body, and mind-mind interactions; and 2) relative
attributes ground all of these unions. The action and passion relation facilitates the back and forth
from one subject to the next. In the case of body-body union the link is based on the relative
attribute of proximity and the relation of action and passion dynamic is based on their mutual
proximity and dependence.83 Note that proximity does not belong to one or the other body
simpliciter, but rather, is a relational attribute in their union. For example, when two billiard balls
collide and move, this movement is effected by their proximity and mutual dependence. Suppose
body A collides with body B, if the power of body A in its forward movement is less than the
resistance of body B (meaning body B is heavier than body A) the motion is retained but the
direction of motion is changed relative to body A. The force of heavier body B causes a change
in movement because without this force body A would continue its forward motion in a straight
line. This change of direction takes place because the two bodies are united, even though not a
true union, they share a relationship of mutual proximity and dependence. Similarly, if the
power of moving forward in body A is greater than the resistance of body B (meaning now body
A is heavier than body B) the collision between the two bodies brings about movement in body
B. Here the quantity of motion is equally distributed from body A onto body B bringing about
movement. Once again, this movement is made possible because the two united bodies share a
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relationship of mutual proximity and dependence founded in their relative attribute of
proximity.84 For La Forge, the above description of Descartes third law of nature, is captured in
the action and passion dynamic effected by their proximity. The union of these two bodies is
terminated once the two bodies cease to be near each other or the mutual proximity and
dependence between the two bodies is lost once they are no longer sharing the relative attribute
of proximity.
In the mind-mind cases, the relative attribute which provides a link of their union is based
on love and their action/passion dynamic is based on the relation of reciprocal love. 85 According
to La Forge, love allows for two minds to be “perfectly united when they love each other so
much that they come to wish for nothing else and have no other thought apart from the love of
the other…”. There is a reciprocal love between the two minds which allows for the relation of
action/passion to take place while the union takes place due to the relative attribute of love.
Reciprocal love makes it possible for a relationship of dependence between two minds as one
acts and acted upon (and vice versa). For example, in cases of divine, romantic, or
sisterly/brotherly love, this union of mind-mind ceases to be once the reciprocal love is gone.
Finally, the link which allows for the union of mind-body is based on the relative attribute of will
because, “the will goes out of the subject by its actions”. 86 The relation of action and passion
dynamic for mind and body is based on their mutual and reciprocal dependence, La Forge writes,
“speaking generally, that the union of a mind and body consists in a mutual and reciprocal
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dependence of thoughts of one of them on the movements of the other”. 87 The will provides the
linkage between two differing substances of mind and body and it is their relationship of “mutual
and reciprocal dependence” which facilitates the “thoughts of one of them on the movements of
the other”.88 This union also ceases to be once this mutual and reciprocal dependence is broken
with the death of the body. I will examine the interaction of the mind-body and provide
examples of their interaction in Chapter Three in my review of La Forge’s aversion cases. But,
for now, it is enough to note that the true union is between mind and body. The relative attribute
of will provides a link between the two differing substances (mind and body) and it is based on
their relationship of mutual and reciprocal dependence.
To recap, in the case of body-body there is a relationship of mutual proximity and
dependence, and in the case of mind-mind there is a relationship of reciprocal love based on their
relative attribute of proximity and love which fulfills the first requirement of the union criterion
(share some kind of relation or dependence). As already discussed earlier the body-body and
mind-mind union does not meet the second part of the union criterion and as such are not
considered true unions. While in the case of mind-body union they meet both of the union
criteria. It’s a union of two differing substances and their shared relationship based on the
relationship of affirmation and relationship of origins accounts for the resemblance and
dependence that mind and body share. The relationship of affirmation accounts for the
resemblance between two things which are related to one another in virtue of their relative
attribute. The attribute of the will (in the case of mind and body) facilitates the action and
passion dynamic. The relation of origins which enables the will, to go out of the subject by its
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actions (the mind) and becomes attached to the other (the body) – providing the linkage that is
the mutual and reciprocal dependence. 89 This, facilitates the thoughts of one to the movement of
the other and vice versa. Thus, the only true union is one found between mind and body. The
establishment of union is imperative because it provides the necessary commonality necessary
between two distinct substances to set the foundation for examination of interaction between
mind and body. Finally, since the union of body-body or mind-mind are not cases of true union
they should not to be used as exemplar cases. Scholars make a mistake in using cases of bodybody (or mind-mind) as exemplar cases to base the union (and ultimately interaction) of mind
and body.
According to La Forge, there are six things that we can say in regard to the union of mind
and body. First, the union (mind-body) is reciprocal “the body can stimulate various thoughts in
the mind and, mind can cause various movements in the body.” 90 Second, the union is universal.
The entirety of the soul is united to the entirety of the body. Meaning the soul is not united to
some parts of the body while excluding other parts of the body. 91 Yet, the union is specific
because not all thoughts are dependent on the movement of the body and not all movements are
dependent of thought of mind. 92 Thirdly, the union of mind and body is immediate because,
“motions of body bring their sensations instantaneously and the soul moves the body as soon as
it decides to do.”93 Fourthly, the union of mind and body is stable because, “once nature, or
chance, or our will has joined some thoughts of our mind with some of the our body’s
movements which are especially destined to stimulate the mind’s thoughts, a particular

89

Treatise 121
Treatise 126
91
Ibid.
92
Treatise 126 - 127
93
Treatise 127
90

38

movement dose not re-occur anymore without the same thought re-occurring in the mind.”94
Similarly the same thought cannot re-occur in the soul without the same movement re-occurring
in the body. Fifthly, the union is very close because it is not disturbed by moments of sleep,
lethargy, or ecstasy. The interaction of mind and body is not restricted to one or two actions but
rather the interaction takes place frequently. The thoughts of the soul which is joined to the
movements of the body are based on the confused perceptions of the senses like, hunger, thirst,
pain, and the “emotion of desire” which bring the union closer. 95 By contrast, if the thoughts of
the soul were joined to the movements of the body on clear and distinct perceptions of the
understanding then, the union would be voluntary as opposed to the union being involuntary
(more will be said on this below). Sixthly, “this union depends so little on our will” because the
will cannot control the duration and time for which the union takes place (it does not control
when the body dies, and the union ceases to be). The will does not get to choose the body it is
united to and, once united the will cannot leave the body to which it is united to nor change its
association to another body. The will cannot avoid the constant flow of perception from the
senses. The will cannot avoid being moved by thoughts which bring about movements in the
body, all it can do is not to assent to them (especially in cases of involuntary action). 96

2.3 The union thesis is not based on occasionalist assumptions
Thus far we have discussed what should be considered as a union and once we have
identified what is to be considered as a true union, we discussed what provides the link between
them and the relative relations that facilitate the action and passion dynamic. However, in the
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same chapter that La Forge provides us with an account of union he also makes statements such
as:
…whether the cause this dependence from the will of the mind which is united or derives
from another will which is superior to its own. 97
…likewise we could not conceive clearly and distinctly of anything which could unite the
mind and body, or which could attach the thoughts of one to the movements of the other
and make them dependent on them, apart from its own will or some other superior will. 98
…whether it is the will of the mind which is united made it thus dependent or some other
will of the mind which is united which made it thus dependent or some other will which
made it subject to it.99
It must therefore be the will of the mind which is united, or the will of some other mind
which has as much power over its thoughts as the mind itself and which unites some of
these thoughts with certain movements of the body and determines the manner and
duration of the union.100

If the above quotes are taken to stand alone it may seem that union of mind and body is based on
occasionalism. The occasionalist principle states that that all created things have no causal
agency and that God is the source of both the universal and secondary causes. Bodies or minds
equally lack causal agency. For example, the mind does not cause the body to take any action
and vice versa, bodies have no causal powers over minds to bring about thoughts. God is the one
and only true cause bringing about the effects of an event. For example, “when a needle pricks
the skin, the physical event is merely an occasion for God to cause the relevant mental state
(pain); a volition in the soul to raise an arm or to think of something is only an occasion for God
to cause the arm to rise or the idea to be present to the mind…”. 101 In the introduction of Nicolas
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Malebranche Philosophical Selections Nadler identifies La Forge as an occasionalist like his
contemporaries Géraud de Cordemoy (1626 – 1684) and Nicolas Malebranche (1638 – 1715).102
However, La Forge clarifies his stance and the role God plays:
It will also be objected that this union would not be natural but merely moral, because it
would be merely the result of the will of a free mind. I reply, firstly, that the conclusion is
unjustified unless one wishes to claim that when I roll a ball freely, the movement I give
it and all the effects which result from that are not natural because they we caused
voluntarily and freely by me. But I would want this union to be simply moral when it is
the mind itself which is united with a body which has attached its own thoughts to certain
movements of the body and which can therefore break or change this union when it
seems appropriate. One cannot say the same when the union is not in its power and when
the mind does not choose to be or not to be united. On the contrary, when this union
results from God’s decree by which he decided to govern all creatures in the way in
which we perceive they are governed, it should be classified as something which is just as
natural as anything else that happens in the world. For what is nature, when the word is
not understood as the specific essence of each thing, except the order by which God rules
over his creatures? Therefore everything which happens in virtue of this order happens
naturally.103

As La Forge points out in a case of a ball that I roll down the hill, when the ball does move and
its effect, rolling down the hill, I would claim that the ball, its motions, and effects are behaving
according to its natural states – the three laws of motions. In the same sense when “God
decree[s]” the union to take place between mind and body it is only because God governs all its
living creatures in the sense of being their total and efficient cause and not because God wants to
cause each and every thought and movement in His created creatures. The union for La Forge is
involuntary. Mind and body are not united based on the desires of the will because, if it were free
to join or separate according to its will (as a pilot is joined to a ship) the mind would not love nor
respect the body. As La Forge puts it,
…if our mind perceived clearly everything which injures or tickles its body in the same
way as a pilot perceives what is beneficial or harmful with his ship; if we experienced the
sharpness of the acidic liquid which causes hunger only as he sees the rot which corrodes
102
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his vessel, it is certain, I maintain, that this mind would have much more reason to think
of itself as something with completely separate interests which is distinct from the body,
rather than at present when it is joined from the first moment of its creation without being
able to separate from it. 104

If the union were voluntary (and not decreed by God) then, the mind would think itself as
separate and not united so that, when the body felt the discomforts of hunger, thirst, and pain it
could disassociate from the body. Additionally, human will can be defective, as such, the
establishment of union should not depend on the human will as a defect that can break the
union.105 Furthermore, acknowledging that the union is decreed by God, here La Forge can easily
transition into an occasionalist doctrine to solve the union problem that the Cartesian philosophy
faces. Rather, La Forge continues to state that God decrees the union because he “governs all
creatures” as the author of the created creatures and human beings (as one of His creatures) fall
under His creation. The union is not freely chosen by an individual being but rather being united
is part of an individual’s nature. The human mind does not get to choose the body to which it is
united. Union is just as natural as anything else that happens in the world. Meaning that even
though God created human beings, the union of mind and body occur according to the nature of
union and not by some occasionalist doctrine. In addition, once union of mind and body in a
particular case is established the will has the freedom to choose which thoughts it will further
associates with and which ones it disassociates. La Forge tells us that the will has the power to
“link some of its thoughts with some motions of the body with which they were not previously
joined, and to dissociate others from those with which they had been joined in order to substitute
alternatives in their place.” 106 While in a state of union human beings are free to choose (or direct
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the motion) of certain thoughts to associate with certain movements. It is not God controlling this
association it is the volitional power of the will. Moreover, La Forge spends chapters building
and explicating the mutual dependence that mind-body share. Hence, mind-body union is based
on shared relations and not based on an ever-acting God.
We have union of mind and body; the union is a hybrid mode (a way of being of the
relation between mind and body) which is linked via the relative attribute of will. But it is the
relation of mutual and reciprocal dependence that allows for the action of one to be a passion in
another. This solution provides an account of union, how two differing substances can be linked
but, more importantly, it gives an account that is non-spatial. As such we should take what La
Forge offers in Treatise on the Human Mind in advancing the union (and ultimately the
interaction) thesis earnestly. La Forge’s account of union is robust, and it provides an account of
commonality between two distinct substances that is lacking in Descartes’s account. His
influence on Malebranche suggests that he is not a minor Cartesian figure and should be
evaluated in his own right. 107 To further substantiate what he offers is significant evidence must
be gleaned carefully from the text, analyzed, scrutinized and synthesized.

2.4 Why we should take what La Forge offers in earnest
In this section, I want to offer a different kind of evidence. The attempt will be to
demonstrate a correlation between terms used both in La Forge’s Treatise and Descartes Regulae
by using an analytic tool called Voyant. Then, via historical evidence I will establish that there is
a high probability that the terms used by La Forge came from Descartes’s Regulae text. It is
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evident that La Forge is influenced by Cartesian philosophy, but more is required to show that a
very specific text was behind the influence in allowing La Forge to build his account of union and
its criteria.108
In order to engage in this process of discovery and appraisal of such possible influence, I
employed Voyant to aid in identifying certain correlations in the text that would likely not have
been discovered with the traditional approach of close reading. The use of Voyant facilitated the
finding of quantitative data that is meant to be supplemental to a philosophic close reading and not
a replacement. Analytical tools like Voyant can help to quantify data, measure the frequency with
which a phrase or word appears in the text, and calculate the relationship between two terms that
appear in the text. The generation of new data representations can be helpful in re-reading and reevaluating long-standing texts. The use of an analytic tool coupled with close reading of the text
allows room for the comparison of two complex philosophical texts and allows for the engagement
of new questions such as, are La Forge and Descartes using the same base term pairs such as
‘relative attribute’ and ‘mutual dependence’?
Since, La Forge’s solution to the union problem is that mind and body are linked via the
relative attribute of will and have a shared relation based on mutual and reciprocal dependence, I
focused my search in Voyant to base term pairs ‘mutual dependence’ and ‘relative attribute’ in
order to discover if Descartes’s text contained meaningful data for comparison. In turn, I used the
base term pairs as guidance for selecting which chapters of La Forge’s Treatise I would use. I
started with Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), which provides the foundation
of his first principles, and The Principles of Philosophy (1644), which provides the clearest
statement of his metaphysical framework and the new mechanistic philosophy in contrast to the
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Scholastic philosophy. I searched these seminal texts to discover what might be the source of
influence on La Forge’s account of the union thesis. However, neither text provides an account of
how mind and body are united and interact. This task was left to be completed in Descartes’s
Treatise on Man, or the unfinished parts of The Principles of Philosophy. According to Clark, the
Treatise,
…began with the following sentence, describing the hypothetical human beings who were
to be explain in that work: ‘These human beings will be composed, as we are, of a soul and
body; and, first of all, I must describe the body for you separately; then, also separately,
the soul; and finally I must show you how these two natures would have to be joined and
united to constitute human beings resembling us. 109

But the unfinished Treatise on Man only provides an account of the brain and its function and
nothing on a schema of how two differing substances are united and interacting. Nevertheless, La
Forge claims that had Descartes continued to live he would complete the remainder of his work in
the same way as La Forge has laid it out in Treatise on Human Mind.110 Meaning that had Descartes
had the opportunity to develop his thesis on union of two differing substances his response would
be either exactly or closely resembling the solution that La Forge provides – that the union is a
mode of being and that it is linked via the relative attribute of will. According to Wilkin, La Forge
states that:
…there was so little work left to do. “I thought I could pull sufficient material from the
works that he himself [Descartes] published to construct their entire work,” for Descartes
had said just enough in his writings for La Forge to discern “how he would have spoken
about it, if he had wanted to write about it.” 111
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As La Forge puts it, “no one should object if I quote various passages from Mr. Descartes in this
way, since I only claim to borrow his ideas here and to provide a supplement to what he would
have said about the nature of the mind at the end of his Treatise on Man, if death had not prevented
him from completing it.”112 If Meditations, The Principles of Philosophy and Treatise on Man do
not provide an account of how mind and body are united then, why is La Forge confident that his
account of the union thesis is the one that Descartes would write? The aim of what is to follow is
to make a case that La Forge was deeply influenced not just by the above-mentioned Cartesian
texts but persuaded by an unpublished manuscript of Descartes’s titled the Regulae Ad
Directionem Ingenii. I argue, based on data collected from Voyant, that there is a correlation
between the terms, specifically the base pairs ‘relative attribute’ and ‘mutual dependence’, found
in both La Forge’s Treatise and Descartes’s Regulae. In addition, historical context will
demonstrate that La Forge had access to this unpublished manuscript which, allows La Forge to
flesh out the Cartesian union thesis.
In Voyant I used the Collocates, Correlation, and Context tools. 113 Using Voyant as an
analytical tool, it permits the discovery of quantitative data that allows for the appraisal of whether
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J.R. Firth introduced the term “collocations” to account for the distinctiveness and frequency with which word
combinations occurred. Stefan Evert in, “Corpora and Collocations” defines collocation, “as a combination of two
words that exhibit a tendency to occur near each other in natural language, i.e. to co-occur.” “Co-occurrence”
describes the identification of collocations. Co-occurrence, or “nearness” of two words, can be measured in three
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The second approach is textual co-occurrence, which refers to words that appear in the same text unit, such as a
sentence, clause, paragraph, or document. The third approach is syntactic co-occurrence, which occurs when words
form a direct syntactic relationship. For example, the relationship we find between a noun and its modifying
adjective or the relationship between a verb and its object noun are syntactic relationships. The collocates tool in
Voyant is using the surface co-occurrence approach to identify the frequency of words that co-occur within the
user’s defined collocational span. The most common range is three to five words. (Evert, 2007, p. 12) Increasing the
collocational span increases the likelihood of finding more numerous instances of the word collocated with the
keyword or node. For example, when searching the word “relative” in the Treatise with a span of five words the
results generated or the collates are, “attribute,” “sought,” “respective,” “obvious,” and “means.”
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there is a linear relationship between the terms in the base pairs ‘relative attribute’ and ‘mutual
dependence’. This, then, allows for the evaluation of if the usage of base pairs is similar in both
texts. In order to collect quantitative data, I used the Collocation tool in Voyant to collect values
of each term and then, determined if the base pairs of ‘relative attribute’ and ‘mutual dependence’
co-occurred in both the Treatise and Regulae. I then confirmed this co-occurrence by referencing
the Correlation tool checking for a positive or linear relationship between the base pairs (terms).
The Context tool was then used to ensure that the context I was after was the correct one.
Voyant produces amazing visualizations but more importantly it produces meaningful data.
According to Voyant, there are 7 instances in which the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘dependence’ appear
near each other or co-occur. Meaning that there are 7 instances (between both documents, Treatise
and Regulae) that we have the base pair ‘mutual dependence’. The terms ‘mutual’ and
‘dependence’ co-occur 6 times in Treatise and once in the Regulae. We can further drill into
The ’Correlations’ tool in Voyant examines and explores the frequency of which terms appear in a given
document. The “correlation coefficient is calculated by comparing relative frequencies of terms (relative to each
document for the corpus or relative to each segment of document). A coefficient that approaches 1 indicates that
values correlate positively, they rise and fall together. A coefficient that approaches -1 indicates that values
correlates negatively, frequencies rise for one term as it drops for the other. Coefficients that approach 0 indicate
little correlation, positive or negative” (Correlations – Voyant Tools Help) . It assesses the relationship that two
terms may have between one another. Voyant tool calculates correlations based upon the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient. The coefficient calculates the relationship (in this case a linear relationship) between two variables. The
two variables are described as term X and term Y (or term 1 and term 2 as found in Voyant). Each variable or terms
will have a value of -1, 0, 1. A value of 1 indicates that there is a linear relationship between the two terms, X and
Y. For example, I will be evaluating if terms ‘relative’, ‘attribute’ (first base pair), ‘mutual’, and ‘dependence’
(second base pair) have a linear relationship in both texts. This linear relationship indicates that when we see the
value of X increase, the value of Y also increases. A value of -1 indicates that there is an inverse relationship
between the two terms—as X decreases the value of Y increases (and vice versa) and as such these are not the base
pairs I will be evaluating because there is no relationship. Finally, a value of 0 indicates that there is no direct linear
relationship (either positive or negative) between the two terms.
The ‘Contexts’ (or KWIC – Keyword in Context) tool in Voyant displays the chosen term and the
surrounding texts that appear before and after the term. This tool allows for a contextual look at how the given term
(or keywords) appear and are used in the different sections of a document. The data (or the gird in Voyant tools)
will display the document and section that the term is derived from and will also display the contextual words that
surround the term/keywords to the left and right. By default, the display in Voyant will always showcase the most
frequently used terms in the document, and it is up to the researcher to know and search for a specific term. The
researcher can also decide and control how many surrounding words should appear before and after the term when
being displayed. For example, should it be 5 words or 10 words before and after the term to capture the context with
which the term is used.
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Voyant and find phrases like: “mutual proximity and dependence”, “mutual concurrence
interaction and a reciprocal dependence”, “mutual and reciprocal dependence”, and “mutual
dependence” co-occur near one another in the Treatise. In the Regulae the phrase “mutual
dependence” also co-occurs. We know that the terms co-occur but is there a relationship between
the terms. Does the appearance of one base term increase the appearance of second base term?
For these results I looked at each individual text separately in Voyant. 114 In Treatise when
looking at base pair ‘relative attribute’, we have a correlation value of 0.982 (a value close to 1)
meaning that as the term ‘relative’ appears in the text there is an increase in the appearance of the
term ‘attribute’. There is a linear relationship between the terms ‘relative’ and ‘attribute’.
However, a similar relationship does not occur when we search the term ‘attribute’. There is no
relationship to the base pair ‘attribute relative’. Meaning that order of terms matters. The
appearance of the term ‘attribute’ bears no relationship to the occurrence of the term ‘relative’ but
as incidence of the term ‘relative’ increases so does the occurrence of the term ‘attribute’. In the
Regulae no such relationship can be found between the terms ‘relative’ and ‘attribute’. The linear
relationship found in the Regulae between the term ‘relative’ is with the terms ‘degree’, ‘absolute’,
‘genus’. The term ‘relative’ denotes a relationship (synonyms are: reciprocal, comparative, etc.)
and as such it makes sense that in a logical text as the appearance of the term ‘relative’ increases
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Results:

Base pairs: Relative Attribute

Treatise

Correlation value of 0.982
There is a linear relationship
The terms co-occur

Regulae

no correlation between the base pairs
but the terms do co-occur
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Base pairs: Mutual
Dependence
Correlation value: 0.776
There is a linear relationship
The terms co-occur
Correlation Value: 0.667
There is a linear relationship
The terms co-occur

so does the appearances of terms like ‘genus’ and ‘degree’. Thus, there is not a linear relationship
between the terms ‘relative’ and ‘attribute’ in the Regulae but, the terms do co-occur.
In the case of the base pair ‘mutual dependence’ in the Treatise there is a value of 0.776
between the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘dependence’. The value is significant (is meaningfully above a
random result) and this value signifies that there is a linear relationship between the terms ‘mutual’
and ‘dependence’. So, that as the term ‘mutual’ increases in the Treatise so does the term
‘dependence’. So, there is a linear relationship in the base pair ‘mutual dependence’. In the
Regulae we find a value of 0.667 between the term ‘mutual’ and ‘dependent’. There is a linear
relationship between the term ‘mutual’ and ‘dependent’ so, as one term increases so does the other
term. As such, both base pair terms ‘relative attribute’ and ‘mutual dependence’ co-occur in both
texts. There is a linear relationship between the term ‘relative’ and ‘attribute’ found in the Treatise
but not in the Regulae. There is a linear relationship between the term ‘mutual’ and ‘dependence’
in both texts.
When Voyant is being used as an analytic tool we can demonstrate correlation between the
terms used in both text and that each term occurs near each other in both text but, the limitation of
Voyant is that it does not establish causality. Meaning, Voyant cannot tell us if in fact La Forge
was influenced directly by Descartes’s Regulae, all it can tell us is that analogous terminology can
be found in both texts. However, examination of historical evidence can provide the necessary
context needed to make a strong case that in fact La Forge’s union thesis was inspired by
Descartes’s Regulae.
First, some background on this unpublished, unfinished Cartesian text. Claude Clerselier
(executor of Descartes’s work) in preparation for the publication of Descartes’s Treatise on Man
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hires La Forge (physician by practice) to draw illustrations of the brain.115 Additionally, with
encouragement from Clerselier, La Forge provides lengthy comments to Descartes’s Treatise on
Man, which Clerselier used to publish, L’Homme de Rene Descartes et un Traitte de la Formation
du Foetus du mesme autheur, Avec les Remarques de Louys de la Forge, Docteur en Medicine,
demeurant a La Flèche, sure Le Traite de Rene Descartes; & sur les Figures par Lucy Inventees
in 1664.116 In the Remarques Clerselier, “even esteems that Gutschoven and La Forge ‘succeeded
better than Mister Descartes’” in essentially inventing figures needed for the manuscript. 117
Furthermore, according to Clerselier, in cases where it was unclear what Descartes’s figures were
supposed to portray, La Forge,
…“was bolder; and to show everybody that he is no slave to Mister Descartes’s opinions,
and that if he sometimes adopts them, it is only by deference to reason and not to authority,
he did not hesitate to stray here from the Author’s thought, and to substitute his own in its
place”. Clerselier’s (very Cartesian) approval of La Forge’s disregard for authority and
authenticity...118

La Forge never afraid to portray an accurate account of the anatomy of the brain even if he felt
Descartes’s had gotten it wrong. In the process of aiding Clerselier with the publication of
Remarques, La Forges notices gaps in the Cartesian philosophy, that Descartes explains succinctly
all the functions which occur in man except the perceptions of understanding and determination of
the will.119 In writing the Remarques, Clerselier gave La Forge access to all of Descartes’s works
in order for him to have a firm understanding of the Cartesian philosophy. Hence, one can assume
this included access to both published and unpublished works of Descartes – works like, Regulae

According to Wilkin (2003) La Forge was, “a regular, like Clerselier, at the Scientific conferences hosted by
Henri-Louis Hébert de Montmor and a self-described ‘disciple of Mister Descartes’” 42.
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ad Directionem Ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the Mind). This is not an implausible
assumption since there are historical facts that corroborate that Clerselier shared the manuscript
with other Cartesian scholars of the time. For example,
…in the second edition of the Logic of Port Royal (1664) the philosophical logicians
Antoine Arnauld (1612 – 1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625 – 1695) employed an extensive
extract, translated into French, from Rules XIII and XIV of the Regulae – indicating that
Clerselier had provided the manuscript. 120
The Regulae was published in “Holland in 1684, and the first Latin edition was published in
Amsterdam by P. and J. Blakey in 1701. 121 Regulae, written between 1626 – 1628 was never
published during Descartes’ (or La Forge’s) lifetime.
In the inventory of Descartes’ papers made at Stockholm shortly after his death in 1650 the
work is listed as ‘Nine notebooks bound together, containing part of a Treatise on clear and
useful Rule for the Direction of the Mind in the Search for Truth’. 122
The text was to comprise three parts, each part containing twelve rules. The text we have today is
incomplete and it comprises a total of twenty-one rules.123 However, there is no historical
documentation from Clerselier that substantiates La Forge’s access to the Regulae. And neither
does La Forge himself cite directly from the Regulae in his Treatise. Nevertheless, familiarity with
both texts permits one to see the influences of the Regulae on La Forge’s Treatise. Yet, knowing
that La Forge had access to the manuscript is not enough to make the case that he was inspired by
Descartes’s Regulae when forming his union thesis. However, knowing that La Forge had access
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to the document via Clerselier coupled with the quantitative data collected from Voyant allows us
to make the claim that La Forge’s union thesis was persuaded by what he read in the Regulae.

2.5 Conclusion
Based on the union criteria La Forge sets out, I have established that the true union is
between mind and body. Since union is needed and crucial in providing the commonality between
two distinct substances in order to discuss causation (interaction), the exemplar case should be
mind-body and not body-body. Mind and body are linked via the relative attribute of will and share
a relationship of mutual and reciprocal dependence. The union is a hybrid mode – a way of being
of the two substances if and when they are united. Because the union of mind and body is based
on a common relation, a causal relation between mind and body is also possible. Finally,
combining the use of an analytical tool (Voyant) with our traditional close reading approach we
are able to re-read Descartes Regulae and La Forge’s Treatise and gain a new and valuable
perspective. Such use of tools initiates the discussion of why we should take La Forge’s union
thesis seriously and to recognize that the inspiration of union thesis come from Descartes’s
Regulae. This is important because the Regulae was never published during La Forge’s lifetime.
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Chapter 3 – Interaction of Mind and Body

3.1 Introduction to the problem of Mind-Body Interaction

If Cartesian dualism is accepted, mind and body are distinct and separate entities and it is
unclear how an immaterial thing can affect a material thing and vice versa. This problem of
interaction is captured in a letter from Princess Elisabeth on 6 May 1643,

So I ask you please to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking
substance) can determine the bodily spirits, in order to bring about voluntary actions. For
it seems that all determination of movement happens through the impulsion of the thing
moved, by the manner in which it is pushed by that which moves it, or else by the
particular qualities and shape of the surface of the latter. Physical contact is required for
the first two conditions, extension for the third. You entirely exclude the one [extension]
from the notion you have of the soul, and the other [physical contact] appears to me
incompatible with an immaterial thing. 124
As aptly described by Princess Elisabeth, it is not clear how the observed effects (movement of
bodies and more specifically voluntary actions) are caused by the soul/mind (a thinking
substance). For it seems that the determination of all movement comes to be by 1) impulsion, 2)
propulsion and 3) modes of an extended body such as shape or size. In the first and second cases,
physical contact is required; for example, the two objects must touch if one is to push or pull the
other. In the third case, extension and its modes are required to affect the motion or direction of
motion of other bodies. According to Descartes, the soul (thinking substance) is devoid of all
material properties and incapable of spatial relationships, so it is not clear how the cause or
determination of motion could ever be the soul.
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Nevertheless, according to La Forge, the mind/soul has the power to move the body and
the body has the power to stimulate various thoughts (ideas) in the mind as the “necessary
consequences of the union.”125 The mutual and reciprocal dependence is the interaction that takes
place between mind and body. Due to their mutual dependence, certain actions of the body cause
the mind to be acted on (passions) and certain actions of mind cause the body to be acted on. 126
Due to this reciprocal dependence “the body stimulates various thoughts in the mind, but the
mind can also cause various movements in the body.”127 Although there is nothing in the nature
of body that can force the mind to depend on its thought and there is nothing “either in motions
and thoughts in general or in motions and thought in particular” which joins a certain thought
with a certain motion, at least not necessarily, we can turn to the nature of both mind and body
for the causal source between “a particular thought and a particular movement.” 128 Thus,
according to La Forge, the mind-body union, which establishes the mutual dependence of
particular thoughts of the mind with particular motions of the body, constitutes the interaction of
mind and body.
The nature of the mind, as we shall examine below, is such that the power of the soul/will
can and does determine the motion and direction of the animal spirits which in turn bring about
movements in the body. For example, if someone desires to eat, the will conjures thoughts of
chocolate cake which in turn produce corresponding patterns on the pineal gland such that the
person takes the action of pursuing and eating chocolate cake. Likewise, the body by its very
nature communicates motion through the animal spirits to the mind and brings about thoughts in
the mind. For example, if someone is pricked by a pin, the animal spirits course through the
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body and produce a pattern and motion on the surface of the pineal gland such that the sensation
of pain is produced. This particular motion-sensation pair is established by nature. La Forge
further posits that the interaction between a particular thought to a particular body is based on an
equivocal cause. Where the effect (various movements of body) does not resemble the cause
(various thoughts in the mind). Mind-body interaction takes place indirectly and not directly; in
that the mind acts on the body by means of forming ideas, and the body likewise acts on the
mind by means of producing ideas. In other words, the mechanism of interaction is the ideamotion pairs that are established through the union at birth or through habit and experience. The
union is based on the mutual and reciprocal dependence of mind and body which gives rise to an
action and passion dynamic. The body is acted on when it is directed by the mind and acts when
it produces certain ideas in the mind; the mind acts upon the body when through the
determination of its will produces movements in the body. 129 Thus, La Forge answers the
questions posed by Princess’s Elisabeth in her letter to Descartes by giving an account of how
the will is the cause that “determine[s] the bodily spirits”.
The aim of this chapter is to build on La Forge’s account of union in the previous chapter
and explore in detail what La Forge offers as the cartesian account of causal interaction between
mind and body. La Forge introduces two kinds of particular (secondary) causes – a corporeal
and a spiritual cause – that he posits to explain how particular bodies interact with other bodies
and minds. I will explore how La Forge thinks particular causes work and assess whether or not
they are real causes. This will allow me to evaluate the claim of occasionalism in La Forge. I
will argue that his general account of causation is non-occasionalistic, as exemplified in his
account of mind-body interaction. The more difficult case of body-body interaction will be
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taken up in the next chapter. In Section 2, I will explore causal interaction in La Forge’s work,
by examining his account of universal causes, particular causes, laws of union, and the bidirectional nature of mind-body interaction. In Section 3, I will explain how the laws of union
work and cover some key examples such as aversion. Finally, in Section 4, I will evaluate why
La Forge’s general model of causation is non-occasionalistic and assess its merits.

3.2 What is Causal Interaction for La Forge? Particular Causes and Laws of Union
3.2.1 Types of causation and causal relation
In his book Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians, Steven Nadler discusses
the concept of “occasional causation” as a general model of causation of which occasionalism is
merely a species. The confusion of occasionalism with occasional causation has led to
misinterpretations of the Cartesian account of body-body and mind-body interaction. As Nadler
puts the point, “certain thinkers who employ occasional causation to explain a given set of
relations are often mistaken for occasionalists.” 130 Occasional causation (not occasionalism)
should be the model of causation used to evaluate Cartesian philosophy. To make this case,
Nadler contrasts occasional causation with another seventeenth century causal theory known as
transeunt efficient causation. Transeunt casual model asserts that:
Generally speaking, one substance, event, or state of affairs, A, is the efficient cause of
another substance, event, or state of affairs, B, if A is the immediate and direct (or
proximate), primary agent of change with respect to B, and is responsible for bringing
about B through its own inherent efficacy or power. 131
A is the immediate and direct cause of B only if there is no intermediator (either event or a thing)
between the cause and effect. For example, if a tennis racket hits a ball, and the ball hits a
130
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window, the tennis racket’s causal relationship to the broken window is indirect. The effect is
mediated by the ball’s causal relationship both to the tennis racket and the window. 132 A is a
primary cause of B when A on its own is enough to bring about B, and it “is not merely a partial
or contributing cause or necessary condition.” 133 As Nadler explains, depending on how you look
at the tennis racket, it can be viewed as a partial or necessary condition for the window breaking.
Whereas, the ball striking the window with sufficient force is the primary cause (or the sufficient
condition) needed for the window to break. This direct versus indirect distinction can be further
seen when we say that two entities are related “directly (A → B, where A communicates
something to B) or indirectly (A → B → C, where A communicates something to B, which in
turn communicates something to C).”134 Typically transeunt causation was seen as either
engaging in real action or providing an influence upon the effect. One species of causation called
“emanation” states that the cause possesses what it gives to the effect. Another species called
“transference” states that the cause transfers to the effect (for example: heat or motion). 135 In
general,
transeunt or influx causation, something literally passes from cause to effect, either
because the cause gives up something to the effect or because it multiplies something of
its own to share with the effect. 136

Transeunt efficient causation, the standard model of causation in seventeenth century
philosophy, according to Nadler, is not the model found in Descartes or in subsequent
Cartesians. Therefore, La Forge in the Treatiese does not advocate for transeunt efficient
causation as the model to solve the Cartesian problem of interaction. Like Descartes, La Forge
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adopts a strict dualism of mind and body, while also asserting that mind and body causally
interact. Nothing is exchanged, transferred, nor is a third thing created when mind and body
causally interact.
Nadler explicates a model of “occasional causation,” which he sees as a competing
model to “transeunt efficient causation,” in the seventeenth-century debates concerning causes.
According to Nadler,
By contrast, what I am calling “occasional causation” does not require any substantial
likeness between cause and effect and does not involve any kind of influx or
communication. In the technical sense of the term, then, no real influence occurs
between cause and effect. But occasional causation does, however, constitute a real
causal relationship and not just accidental, sequential conjunction. Thus, in a somewhat
broader (hence, weaker) sense, there is an “influence” of cause upon effect, but not of a
transeunt efficient nature. 137
Nadler’s description of “occasional causation,” has two important attributes: its occurrence does
not require resemblance or likeness, nor does it require communication of motion in order to be a
genuine causal relationship. Removing resemblance and communication of motion from this
kind of causation opens up the possibility that mind and body could stand in genuine causal
relation. In “occasional causation” one thing or entity brings about an effect by inducing another
thing or entity to employ its own efficient causal power. The term “occasional causation”
represents the process where, A, occasions another thing, B, to cause e – “even though it is B that
A occasions or incites to engage in the activity of efficient causation in producing e, the relation
of occasional causation links A not just to B, but also (and especially) to the effect, e, produced
by B.”138 In this scenario A is the occasional cause of e and not B, because A occasioned B to

137
138

Ibid.
Ibid.

58

cause e – A is the occasional cause of e.139 The occasional cause (A) stands in a “nomological
correlation” to the effect (e). This relationship is governed by the psycho-physical laws of mind
and body union. The occasional cause is such that it “unites one thing or state of affairs with an
effect wrought (through efficient causation, immanent or transeunt) by another thing.” 140 For
example, in the body-mind interaction, the motions in the body (A), elicit the mind (B - as the
primary and proximate cause) to produce ideas (the effect). The mind, is the immanent cause,
“… since ideas are nothing than modifications or properties of the mind itself, [and] the process
involved when the mind produces an idea would be an immanent efficient causation.”141
However, Nadler does not provide a similarly clear account of what (if any) causal relationship
A has to B. What Nadler tells us is that, “A does not occasion or elicit B’s causal power by
action on B as a transeunt efficient cause.” 142 A occasions and elicits B to use its (B) causal
power to engage in the activity of, efficient, immanent or transeunt causation to produce the
effect. The process of occasional causation links A to B but how they are linked is not clarified
by Nadler. However, La Forge’s account of relations (as discussed in Chapter Two) can fill in
the gap and provide an explanation of how A and B are linked. Accordingly, A (motions in the
body) elicits → B (the mind) as the primary and proximate cause produces the → e (ideas).
Where A (motions of bodies) are linked to B (the mind) based on their shared relationship of

Nadler uses an example from Descartes’s Comments on a Certain Broadsheet to make his point. Where in this
example the promise of compensation is the occasional cause of the work produced by laborers.
“…something can be said to derive its being from something else for two different reasons: either the other
thing is its proximate and primary cause, without which it cannot exist, or it is a remote and merely
accidental cause, which gives the primary cause occasion to produce its effect at one moment rather than
another. Thus workers are the primary and proximate causes of their work, whereas those who give them
orders to do the work, or promise to pay for it, are accidental and remote cause, for the workers might not
do the work without instructions” (CSM I 305).
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mutual and reciprocal dependence which sanctions A to elicit B as the primary and proximate
cause to produce the effect – ideas. Where the relationship of mutual and reciprocal dependence
accounts for what A and B have in common while the laws of union accounts (discussed below)
for how motions in the body, via the mind, generate ideas. Additionally, the above explanation
can be applied to body-body cases to account for movement; A (one body) → B (another body)
→ e (effect – motion). Where body A is linked to body B via their shared relation of mutual
proximity and dependence and as such body A elicits body B as the primary and proximate cause
(only as determining the direction of motion and not as a transeunt cause but as an immanent
cause (as will be discussed in Chapter 4) to produce the effect – motion. Where the type of
motion will be dependent on the three laws of motion. For example, if body A is heavy, then
there will be less resistance in body B and there will be greater motion in body B and if body A
is lighter, then the resistance in body B is greater and the motion will be slight. Based on both
Nadler’s model of occasional causation and La Forge’s account of relations, bodies have agency
to determine and direct motion. Furthermore, A and B are finite beings and “if A and B are finite
beings, then at least one finite being in this setup, B, has efficient causal efficacy.” 143 This is an
important point because in the bidirectional interaction of mind-body and body-mind (as we shall
see below) body too (not just minds) will be in a position of being the total and primary efficient
cause of an effect e.
“Occasional causation,” according to Nadler is not occasionalism, although
occasionalism is a species of “occasional causation.” Occasionalism entails that created things –
minds and bodies – have no causal agency and no power to bring about change in another entity.
According to the thesis of occasionalism, bodies do not cause effects in other bodies nor in
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minds, and similarly minds do not cause effects in bodies nor within themselves. God is the one
true and efficient causal agent, “He is immediately, proximately, and solely responsible for all
natural events or state of affairs.” 144 Thus, the pricking of a needle in my fingertip is not the true
cause of the pain I feel, rather, it’s merely the “occasion” for “God to cause a painful sensation in
my soul, in accordance with the laws of mind-body union.”145 Nadler notes that occasional
causation has no such entailment:
[it does not] require God to be the being, B, whose causal power is occasioned by A. The
relationship between occasional causation and occasionalism is that between genus and
species. Occasionalism represents one species or variety of occasional causation,
namely, that species in which the proximate and efficient cause whose operation (through
efficient causation) is elicited by the occasional cause is God. 146
In addition, Nadler tells us that according to occasional causation, A is not an efficient cause, “A
is neither the primary efficient cause of e nor a contributing or partial efficient cause of e…B is
the total and primary efficient cause of e.”147 Thus, A (as the occasional cause) of e does not
function as an efficient cause, either in a direct sense (A → e) or in an indirect sense: (A → B →
e).148 Nevertheless,
occasional causation – and, in particular, the relation of occasioning that elicits the
operation of efficient causal power in the primary cause – is still a real causal relation,
albeit an inferior or secondary variety if efficient causation is taken to be the standard.149
Occasional causes do not initiate the causal chain as do transuent efficient causes, and occasional
causes are not accidental or coincidental either. In other words, if occasional causes where not
present the process would not proceed as usual – occasional causes are necessary and have a role
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to play or have casual efficacy. Occasional causes do not operate like transeunt causes as in
cases of transference or emanation rather occasional causes participate in a “nomological
correlation.”150 In the case of mind-body interaction, the nomonological correlation is based on
psycho-physical laws of mind and body union. 151 However, Nadler concedes that this correlation
remains unclear. What we do know is that the correlation between A → e is not based on “rerum
natura” that is,
the relationship is not grounded in some ontically real power in A. This, I suggest, is what
distinguishes occasional causation from efficient causation, where the lawlike correlation
is based on some power intrinsic to the (efficient) cause (the correlation between B and e,
for example, is grounded in B’s active power to cause e).152
Hence, the term “occasional causation” designates the process of A not as a primary efficient or
a contributing partial cause of e, but rather, as the occasional (secondary) cause of e that elicits B
(the primary cause) in the operation of its efficient causal power in employing the primary cause.
A is the occasional cause of e but linked to both B and e.
Nadler’s account of “occasional causation” provides three beneficial points relevant to
the current study. First, it provides another avenue of interpretation for Descartes and the socalled Orthodox Cartesians in their account of causal interaction. Secondly, according to
Nadler’s account of occasional causes, in cases of mind-body interaction (as will be
demonstrated below) bodies can have active powers. The active power of causing movement in
limbs as a primary cause and as a secondary cause stimulating ideas (thoughts) in the mind.
Thirdly, it adds justification for a critical reexamination of La Forge’s Treatise on the Human
Mind and the standard view that he was an occasionalist. La Forge’s stance that the union is
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based on a relation of mutual and reciprocal dependence sheds some light in the discussion of
psycho-physical laws and the relationship between the occasional cause (A) and the primary
cause (B). It should also be noted that although Nadler is willing to apply the “occasional
causation” model to the mind-body and body-mind cases he maintains the standard view that
body-body cases are strict transeunt cases of causation. I examine the case for body-body
causation in La Forge further in Chapter Four.

3.2.2 La Forge on Causation
For La Forge there are universal (general) causes that should be distinguished from
particular (secondary) causes. For example, all motion that we observe in bodies are caused by
“God who is the first, universal and total cause of motion.” 153 God is the motive force, “the force
which transports a body from one vicinity to another and which applies it successively to
different parts of bodies”. 154 And as discussed in Chapter Two, the general cause of the union of
mind and body is God (via divine will). God is the efficient cause of this union. La Forge
considers but then rejects that the soul (human will) itself could be the efficient cause of the
union since the will can go outside itself and join itself with something else, but even so, it
cannot be the efficient cause of all unions. La Forge concludes that God is the cause of this
union, “God is therefore the total and proximate cause of the union of thoughts which are found
united with the same movements in all human beings.”155 Unfortunately, it is these claims that
lead some to think that God is the only causal agent in La Forge’s model of causation. La Forge
acknowledges God as the universal and efficient cause, but then adds,
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However you should not say that it is God who does everything and that the body and
mind do not really act on each other. For if the body had not had such a movement, the
mind would never have had such a thought, and if mind had not had such a thought the
body might also never have had such a movement. 156

God as the author of the universe bestows powers onto the human will to have causal power to
bring about movement. Moreover, He creates bodies in such a way to act according to their
natures – a nature that communicates motion and stimulates thoughts in the mind. Thus, La
Forge states that;
…bodies and minds as the particular causes of these same motions, not really producing
any ‘impressed’ quality in the way the Schools explain it, but in determining and forcing
the first cause to apply his force and motive power to the bodies to which he would not
otherwise have applied it, according to the way He decided to govern himself in relation
to bodies and minds; that is, for bodies, according to the laws of motion which are so well
explained in Book Two of Mr Descartes’s Principles; and for minds, according to the
scope of the power which He chose to give to their wills. 157

La Forge recognizes that in addition to a universal cause there are particular causes. These
particular causes are minds and bodies. Mind and body are particular causes that use motion,
which itself was created by God, just as mind and body were substances created by God. Mind
and body determine the direction and the application of motion, according to the laws of motion
and the laws of union which capture the scope of the will’s power.158 The power that bodies and
minds have to bring about specific movements consists in this: that the causal interaction
between a particular mind and a particular body determines motion to take the direction it takes
and have the effects it has. The power which the mind has to move a body and the power the
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body has to stimulate thoughts in the mind are the direct result of the union established by nature.
The union is the, “interaction and reciprocal dependence between the movements of the body
and the thoughts of the mind” for La Forge. 159 Thus, there are two causes of the union which are
the particular (secondary) causes that La Forge posits. The particular causes of the union are the
foundation of interaction.
The first particular cause is spiritual, and it manifests itself in two ways. 160 The first is the
will’s power to determine motions within the physical body and the second is the power of the
soul to affect the pineal gland and the flow of the animal spirits. 161 The second particular cause is
corporeal which is the specific condition occurring in each human being, their temperaments, its
parts, and the configuration of animal spirits.162 Additionally, mind and body interactions are
governed by laws of union. La Forge introduces seven laws of union that capture the parameters
within which the particular causes, such as the will have power to attach an idea/thought to the
movements of the animal spirits, in order to bring about movement and passions.163According to
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La Forge, since, mind and body are really distinct substances it would make sense that they were
governed by laws of union in regards to their interaction. 164
Laws of union can be understood in comparison to the laws of motion. God, “who
prescribed certain laws for himself in governing the world at large should also have made some
particular rules for the conduct of the world in miniature, which he established as a kind of
microcosm of the macroscopic world.” 165 These laws of unions are set by God (since, union is
not voluntary and decreed by God) and as such He set laws to govern them. The laws of union
are:166
1) every motion of animal spirit167 will be accompanied by a certain idea which will
cause the mind to have a certain thought.
2) each of these configurations will be joined naturally to only one idea or one thought
which will always accompany it.
3) this thought will correspond to the state of the body, that is, it will be happy or sad,
confused or clear, depending on the disposition in which it found the body the first time
and the condition it is usually in when the configuration to which this thought is joined is
stimulated on the gland. 168
4) the soul would not have the power to separate this thought from the configuration of
the animal spirits’ motion to which it is naturally joined.
5) the mind’s thoughts which have the body as object would be accompanied reciprocally
by the configuration and pattern of the flow of animal spirits.
6) the movement which would have once accompanied a thought would always
accompany it, so that they could not subsequently separate unless the soul itself changed
the customary connection.
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7) this union will last as long as the heart can send animal spirits towards the gland and
the gland in turn can send them to the muscles through the nerves. 169
Accordingly, these laws are demonstrated by experience, not mathematics. 170 For example, La
Forge states that what he has to say about the “seat of the soul” will prove the first law. The part
of the human body that is united to the mind which allows for the “concurrence and mutual
dependence of the thoughts of one and the movement of the other” is facilitated by the principal
seat of the soul or the pineal gland. 171 La Forge writes, “you remember well that this gland is the
principal seat of the soul and the point at which their mutual communication begins and ends.” 172
As such the pineal gland functions as the intermediary between mind and body so that animal
spirits (accompanied with a certain idea) cause the mind to have a certain thought. The second
and third laws are proven when we consider phantom limb phenomena. Those who still

Law seven is a combination of articles (5,6, 7, 8, and 9) found in Descartes’s The Passion of the Soul. To
construct law seven La Forge used:
Article 5: “Thus it has been believed, without justification, that our natural heat and all the movements of our bodies
depend on the soul; whereas we ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only
because this heat ceases and the organs which bring about bodily movement decay” (CSM I 329).
Article 6: “So as to avoid this error, let us note that death never occurs through the absence of the soul, but only
because one of the principal parts of the body decays” (CSM I 329).
Article 7: “Finally, it is known that all these movements of the muscles, and likewise all sensations, depend on the
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experience the feeling of an itching sensation even though their leg is amputated. As La Forge
says, the feeling of needing to scratch is because the “same thought is always joined with the
same bodily movement” even though the limb is no longer there. 173 The fourth law refers to the
simple and confused “feelings which are caused by the action of objects on our senses” which we
have no control of experiencing. 174 And since we have no control over how we experience
objects we also have no control over how a thought is linked to configuration of animal spirits.
The fifth law is experienced every time we use the faculty of imagination, memory, and move
our limbs.175 The sixth law will be better demonstrated when cases of aversion are discussed
below. Habituation is either broken or reinforced by nature (at birth or by experience) or by the
soul when it exercises its power to keep or stop the connection between a movement and a
thought. Finally, the seventh law addresses that this union between mind and body will continue
as long as the body is alive. Meaning the union ceases to be once the body passes on. 176
Given the laws of union, La Forge examines the conditions under which volitional
powers of the mind (when aware of its activity) obey the laws of union: The will’s power as it
relates to determination of movement, and the power of the soul as the power the mind has over
the movement of the pineal gland and the configuration of the flow of animal spirits.
Accordingly, our will,
does not have power over the muscles alone, but also all the parts where tubes of the
nerves terminate – with this difference, however, that it has the power to move our limbs
directly by willing to move them, whereas it causes movement in other parts only
indirectly.177
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The will regulated to the scope of the physical body versus the power of the soul which “does not
extend beyond the brain – beyond the gland and the animal spirits which flow out of it.”178
It should be noted that the perceptions that emerge due to the unique interaction between
mind and body are called “corporeal species.” La Forge clarifies that ‘ideas’ will be used to refer
to ‘forms of our thoughts’ only. 179 While, the term ‘corporeal species’ or just ‘species’ will refer
to the “particular configurations of the flow of animal spirits and the motions of the gland” and
the immediate thoughts these species connect to in the soul. 180 Thus, species are the result of the
bending of the gland (“animal spirits, flowing out from the gland in a new way, cause it to bend
in that direction”) and the configuration assumed at the same time by the flow of animal spirits
which are connected to the thoughts in the mind (soul). 181
As such there are four different causes of corporeal species. The first cause is the action
of the senses which refers to the objects that strike the nerve fibers of our senses. The second cause
of these species are memory traces. This is the “facility of pores which have already been opened
by the action of objects or by any other cause whatever to reopen a second time.” 182 The third
cause is actions of animal spirits, “which rise from the heart to the brain.” 183 The action of animal
spirits depend on the size and shape of the animal spirit (some are finer than others). The quickness
of motion with which they exit the heart influences the way in which they exist the gland. Finally,
the fourth cause is the power of the soul.184
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Power of the soul has the power and the force to “stimulate or destroy the ideas of the
imaginable things by, stimulating or destroying those corporeal species on the gland with which
these ideas are linked.”185 The power of the soul is immediately joined with the pineal gland which
allows for the communication of the decision and commands made by the mind to be
communicated to the rest of the body. 186 However, there are limitations to the power of the soul,
it cannot increase or diminish the movements of the animal spirits nor does it “extend to pushing
the animal spirits out of the gland in the manner required to retrace the corporeal species of
something which we wish to think about”. 187 Experience teaches us this limitation when we have
a hard time imagining something we want to remember. The power of the soul entails the “power
of directing and limiting the motions of the gland and thereby the flow of animal spirit, to the
extent that the two joining which connect it to the medullar trunk may allow.” 188 This scope of the
power of the soul explains,
how the animal spirits, when they meet the memory traces – or the pores by
which, when opened, the species of the thing one wishes to think about was traced
the first time – they re-open them and, thereby recovering their original
configuration, give to the soul the thought it wished to have and the soul can
continue with that thought as long as it is in control of its attention. 189

This point will be touched on in more detail when we examine the different causes/cases of
aversions below. Nevertheless, La Forge tells us that experience teaches us that we have
perception of external objects and the movements of our body because of impressions that strike
the nerves. La Forge notes that;
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all the ways in which these configurations or species can be stimulated, only those which
depend on the presence and action of objects belong to the senses. All the others whether
produced by the will, memory, or the action of the animal spirits, fall within the scope of
the imagination.190

Besides the species which are initiated by external objects all other species are a product of the
imagination – a faculty that is a direct consequence of the union and interaction of mind and
body. Furthermore, La Forge tells us that,
it is appropriate at this point to examine and compare these corporeal species with one
another because we notice that, in accordance with the laws of union of body and mind,
the ideas they provide of things which can be sensed or imagines are confused or distinct,
depending on what they are ideas of. 191
Recall that the fifth law of the union states that: “the mind’s thoughts which have the body as
object would be accompanied reciprocally by the configuration and pattern of the flow of animal
spirits” and since, the mind would not have had such thoughts if the body did not have such
movements (motion) it makes sense that each thought is joined with an equal and mutual
configuration of animal spirit. As such species caused by the “actions which external objects
impress on the nerve fibers” are the most distinct of all species because they have an object
(unless lacking in some way) as their object. 192 Species that are stimulated by the will on the
gland are the most sharp and distinct because it is the will looking into itself and applying its
own “initiative to think about some particular physical thing.” 193 The species reproduced by
memory traces are the most distinct because, “pores which preserve these traces happen to reopen of their own accord, as a book re-opens by itself at a place where it was frequently
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opened.”194 Finally, the species that are caused by the action of the animal spirits are the most
confused because, the flow of spirits are “irregular, least uniform and least constant”. 195 Flow of
animal spirits are contingent on various causes; for example the condition of the body, the
temperament of the individual, and in cases of memory traces how frequently have the pores
opened for the animal spirits to pass through.
These impressions are then carried to the pineal gland where with the aid of the soul
registers what it is perceiving (the idea/thought that is connected to the corporeal species present
on the gland). Thus,
However a strong soul can eventually erase or at least obscure a sensory impression by
applying itself to think about other things, thereby turning the gland a little from the
position from which it receives the sensory species. But that happens only rarely and as a
result of a long and difficult struggle. 196

Hence, La Forge holds the belief that those who have cases of aversion (regardless of the cause)
are likely subject to those aversions for a lifetime. 197 For, in order to change the aversion, one
must change the association of corporeal species with the thought that brought on the aversion
and while not impossible, the process is difficult.
The power of the will extends into the tubes of nerves as well as the muscles in the
body.198 This point is important because the determination of corporeal species must reach the
pineal gland in order for the will of the mind to be executed. Just like power of the soul, there
are certain movements that do not fall under the scope of the will’s power. These are movements
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in the body that do not give rise to a thought in the mind and as such are not the focus of the will.
These movements are not subject to the laws of the union. For example, the will does not have
the power over our heart beating. It does not have control over the opening and closing the
ventricles in the heart. As Descartes’s explains in The Passions of the Soul,
…every movement we make without any contribution from our will – as often happens
when we breathe, walk, eat, and, indeed, when we perform any action which is common
to us and the beasts – depends solely on the arrangement of our limbs and on the route
which the spirits, produced by the heat of the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves
and muscles.199

Nonetheless, the will has the power to bring about motions in our limbs directly by willing to
move them (voluntary actions). Since these movements take place due to the will’s wishes and
the determination of the particular configurations of animal spirits, they are subjected to the laws
of union. The will has the power to unite a specific thought with the movements of the animal
spirit (in the gland) which never had been united previously. 200 More technically, the soul
determines “the movement of the gland and the flow of animal spirits towards the side of the
brain’s ventricles through which they need to exit to descent to the part of the body which it
wishes to move.”201 In this way, the will impacts other parts of the body indirectly (as an
occasional cause) by executing movement brought on based on passions. While the creation of
passions is articulated through the power of the soul found in the faculty of imagination. Again,
experience shows us that the
will does not have the power to open and close the orifices of the heart simply by willing
to open or close them, but by exciting in itself the passions with which these kinds of
motions are joined, just as it does not have the power to excite a passion by willing to
have it but by applying the imagination to think about the object which can cause such a
199
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motion, because the spiritual idea is always accompanied by a corporeal species which
determines the animal spirits to go into those places by the opening of which the
movements which stimulates this passion are produced…202

The will does not directly control the beating of the heart, yet it can nevertheless slow down the
beating of the heart via the production of passions. The mind can use the will’s power via the
faculty of imagination to create an image that can excite in itself an emotion (in this case an
image of calmness in order to slow down one’s breathing and heart beat). 203 This in turn
produces a certain passion – in this case the passion of calmness – which in turn brings about
(indirectly) the action of the will to slow one’s heart beat or breathing.204 Hence, every idea
(thought) is connected with a corporeal species and corporeal species are determined by the
will’s power to go into certain cavities of the body. Nothing acts directly on the mind (including
its will); all things are communicated to the mind via the understanding (the faculty of
perceiving). As stated, the understanding is the only gateway for entering the mind and the will
is the way in which things exit.
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This brings us to the second particular cause – the corporeal (or the body). The thought
linked to the movement “would coincide with the condition of the body, depending on how the
body was on the first occasion, and how it usually is when the animal spirits exist from the gland
in this particular configuration.”205 Body does not act directly on the mind (or the will); it does
act indirectly by,
means of perceptions and ideas which these motions give rise to in the mind that it has
the force to incline and stimulate the will to consent and to will that to which the
movement which gave this thought to the understanding had disposed the body at the
same time.206
The body acts indirectly on the mind via sense perceptions, “those which are stimulated
primarily by the body without the consent of the will.”207 These sense perceptions are all sense
perceptions that are confused, all dreams and day-dreams, and perceptions of the imaginations
which are not initiated voluntarily. 208 More technically according to La Forge, these sense
perceptions are, “perception[s] which is linked with the movement [simple motion which an
object impresses on the nerves] when the impression is carried to the seat of the soul…”. 209 The
body via sense perceptions, carries a thought or an idea to the mind by the mediation of the
pineal gland and stimulates the mind (the will) to have a thought (or idea). And if the thought is
to walk, the mind executes its will by bringing about movement of limbs. La Forge points out
that sensory perceptions are very confused but when compared to the sensory species they are
most distinct. That is because when we discuss sensory perceptions, we compare them to other
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perceptions (like perceptions we have from pure understanding). It is like comparing the idea of
whiteness to the idea of extension. While in the cases of sensory species, we are comparing
species – configuration of animal spirits – to other species.
These sense perceptions are a direct result of the motions of body communicated to the
mind. Of course, there are perceptions of the mind that solely depend on the will. For example,
the perceptions of pure understanding or perceptions that the “mind perceives [of] its own
actions, for it is impossible to will something without being aware of the fact that one does
so…”210 These sense perceptions provide the mind with clear and distinct perceptions that
provide the source for our judgments of what is truth. They represent to the mind what is harmful
and beneficial for the body. These species are caused by the will or more accurately the will
stimulates these species onto the gland. 211 Species caused by the will are different that those
caused by external objects. The difference between the two species is that,
the union between the ideas of purely sensible and imaginable things and the species
which these things trace on the gland does not depend on our will but comes directly
from nature. In contrast, the link between species stimulated on the gland and the
thoughts or ideas of things which belong to the understanding results from our will,
which has joined them with certain words or other corporeal signs or at least consented to
the will of those who had previously joined them together, and it does not derive at all
from nature.

Those ideas that are lawlike and constant given by nature as sensible things (against the will) do
not depend on the will. But there are also species which are generated by the soul’s volitional
power and it is these species that will movement. Each species is joined with a thought (as the
first law of union states: every motion of animal spirit will be accompanied by a certain idea
which will cause the mind to have a thought), as such there are two thoughts that emerge (since
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we have two sources – mind and body) . These thoughts (in general) are the motion of the
internal part of the brain joined immediately with thoughts of the mind. The first thoughts are
those of confused ideas of sensations, imagination, memory and the obscure feelings we have
when we are hungry, thirsty, and the passions which are connected to various movements of the
body. These thoughts of the mind are caused by the perception of understanding. 212 These
thoughts “represent to us the action of the object either in the object itself and outside our body,
or at least in the extremity of one of our limbs.” 213 The second thoughts are those confused
sensory knowledge united with the motions of body. These thoughts of the mind are caused by
the inclination and determination of the will. These different inclinations of the will bring about
different movements. We have those “constant, lawlike, and involuntary” ideas (thoughts) but we
also have ideas (thoughts) that are produced by the mind’s volitional power and as such are not
constant, lawlike, or against its will. 214 Consequently, we have two particular (secondary) causes
– mind and body – which both have a causal role to play in the interaction of mind and body.
This causal activity is not one of efficient causation as a universal cause (like God) but as a
particular cause and as Nadler tells us this is still a real cause “albeit an inferior or secondary
variety” which has causal agency.
Although, La Forge advances a causal account of mind and body interaction in which
both mind and body have causal power, many scholars maintain that the causal power of the
body is due to it connection with a mind. For example, Nadler writes, “denying that bodies have
moving force might commit you to occasionalism in the body-body case, it certainly does not
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commit you to occasionalism in the body-mind case, particularly if you grant that the soul has an
active power to produce its own ideas.” 215 Nadler, here implies that the a non-occasionalistic
account of interaction of mind and body is conceivable only because of the active power of the
mind. While, cases of aversion (discussed below) will demonstrate the role bodies play in the
causal story of mind and body interaction is much greater than being recognized.

3.3: How the Laws of Union Work: The Case of Aversion

The will can excite in itself the passion with which the motions (of the animal spirits) are
linked. The will cannot directly have the passion but by using the faculty of imagination it can
think about the object which can cause an emotion. This “spiritual idea” plus the “corporeal
species” can determine the movement of the animal spirit and stimulate a passion. The will does
not act directly on the mind to give it a new idea/thought or to bring about movement. Rather by
means of the faculty of understanding an idea is applied by causing the mind to perceive
something which then brings about movement. As such the body acts directly on the
understanding and only indirectly on the will. Consequently, the cases of aversion demonstrate
this unique interaction that takes place between mind and body. The flow of animal spirits being
traced on the gland which in turn generate a passion in the mind which as a consequent produces
a reaction in the body. Aversions according to La Forge are caused by the body, “I mean those
where we can give no good reason why we love or hate certain things.” 216 These aversions are
driven by passions whose impressions have remained in the tissue of the memory. These
impressions could have been while in the mother’s womb or acquired after birth. What should
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be noted is that, “these impressions must be strong and must have been impressed at a time when
the soul was not yet using recollection or, at least, when it had not yet perceived nor reflected on
the first cause of its aversions and inclinations.” 217 La Forge explicates this pathway of continued
aversion:
For if a thing which acted on our senses was very harmful to us, its species, which was
traced on the gland, was followed by the motion of the spirits which stimulates hatred, so
that when this same species is retraced on it later by any cause whatever, even if we do
not remember having perceived it earlier, the same motion of spirits which followed it the
first time continues to accompany it (and consequently to make us feel the same passion
of hatred), because the spirit which form this second species find it easier to flow in the
way which excites this passion than in any other. 218

Of course, one should not be discouraged and think that once this pathway of hatred towards
certain impression (and at times contra to the will wishes) has been established it cannot be
changed. One can with effort and force change the association of an object, which elicits the
impression, with harmful to not harmful. The only way for the mind to correct this association
(motions of species accompanied with the passion of hatred) is to think of another object/thing
“which is usually followed by other motions, and at the same time to make a resolution to stop
the first ones by a contrary act of the will.” 219 However, these natural aversions can last a
lifetime since the effort required to resist the natural pathway of the flow of the species is great.
For example, King James of Great Britain, whose aversion was that when he saw a sword
he displayed severe fright. He believed that the aversion manifested itself while in his mother’s
womb who was “frightened by the murder of one of her officers who was killed in her presence
in her bedroom.”220 Although, according to La Forge, if this was true, he is not sure how a

217

Ibid.
Ibid.
219
Treatise 201
220
Ibid.
218

79

species of a harmful thing (the sword) was sketched in an infant’s gland who could only perceive
the actions of the officer through his mother’s eyes. The likely explanation according to La
Forge is that the object itself (the sword) did not generate the species but rather the surprise the
mother felt at the sight of the murder is what was traced on the gland of the infant. Therefore,
the principle effect of this surprise is to stop the gland at the place from which the species
comes which caused the fright (as Mr Descartes well remarked when he spoke about
wonder), and to carry the spirits in that direction so much that they are taken away from
all other directions. This species is traced not only on the gland of the mother but also on
that of the child…and even more forcefully than on that of the mother, because the
child’s gland is more tender and more capable of being disturbed by it. 221
The surprise is what causes the noticeable change in the mother’s animal spirit which can then
cause a disturbance in the infant in her womb. 222 Thus, after birth it is possible that some traces
of this species remains on the gland. And the sight of the sword in adulthood (although the
animal spirits caused directly by the object of the sword are different) still contain enough
resemblance that the same pathway created in the womb can be traced again and bring about the
aversion (fright) of the sword.
Alternatively, some impressions are so strong that the object need not be present to
initiate the pathway for the particular passion, “it is often enough to imagine it in order to excite
the passion.”223 For example, La Forge tells us about a friend who has an aversion to garlic. This
friend who consumed a sauce, which did not contain garlic, was told that the sauce has garlic.
Upon hearing this the friend began to vomit everything he had eaten. Although, La Forge does
think that this is one of the cases where the aversion can be remedied easily. Going back to his
friend (who is deceived) and consumes a sauce that does have garlic and is not told shows no
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physical reaction. Although those who have a “tender brain” may never get over the aversion
because they cannot do the hard work required to associate the object/thing with different animal
spirits.224
There are cases of aversion where the initiation of the aversion doesn’t start while in the
womb or when an injury occurred in the past. The aversion can occur even when a food we eat
regularly is not bothersome, but it takes only one time to have that same food to leave a bad taste
or upset our stomach to cause an aversion towards that same food. The aversion can remain,
“even though we lose the memory of the particular cause which made us hate it.”225 In these
scenarios the species of hatred is enough to generate the passion of aversion. The lack of
reflection on the particular cause that would generate the species of hatred is enough to generate
the aversion. For example, in cases where we hear the subject (which causes aversion) to be
mentioned and triggers the pathways in the gland to be “reawaken” to bring about the physical
reaction to the aversion. This can be observed in cases of medicine. When the medicine itself
not present but the name generates aversion and the taste of bitterness in the mouth. This
happens because,
the object is so imprinted on our memory, because of our horror of it, that when the
animal spirits are forced to go towards the place of this impression they find paths there
which are so easy to open that they would not be any more so if they actually had the
medicine in their mouth. 226

Hence, the species sketched the second time on the gland by the effort of memory as successfully
as the first time it was traced on the gland by the object itself, the mind does not need the object
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(medicine) to be present but the mere belief that the object (medicine) is present is enough to
generate the aversion and bitter taste in the mouth.
Additionally, what is presented to our senses need not be like its original object which
caused the aversion in us the first time. A slight connection to the original aversion is enough.
Because, “when many pores which are involved in tracing a particular species have often been
opened together and are not usually opened separately, it is not easy subsequently for one of
them to be opened without the other.” 227 If one pore (as part of many pores) opens, this is
enough to generate the opening of all the surrounding pores because, they follow the re-opening
of the first pore. This is due to all pores (including the surrounding pores) being part of the
original traces on the gland and part of the original passion. This level of vagueness is due to the
fact that the first time these impressions and passions were generated were based on obscurity
from infancy or lack any kind of reflection. Thus, the re-opening and the later passions being
retraced on the gland follow this confusion generated with the original passion.
What the aversion cases show is not only that body and mind interact but more
importantly the cause of the passion is the body. The body is affecting the mind when generating
the passion of aversion. In La Forge’s schema of causal interaction, the body via sense
perceptions, communicates the corporeal species which is the motion (flow) of animal spirits
plus the motion of the gland that are joined with the thoughts of the soul to the mind. In this
scenario the body is impacting the mind. The bending of the gland and the configuration
assumed at the same time by the flow of animal spirits can quickly change the association of love
to one of hate and incite a physical reaction even when the object is not present . 228 La Forge has
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examined different cases of aversion but what they all have in common is that the origin of the
passion is physical.

3.4 Conclusion: La Forge’s Non-Occasionalist Model of Mind-Body Causal Interaction
We have seen that La Forge’s causal model of interaction mind and body is one in which
there are particular causes and it is their relation of mutual and reciprocal dependence that allows
for the action of one to bring about the effect in the other. The body’s movements stimulate
thoughts in the mind and the mind’s thoughts bring about movements in body. 229 The body acts
on the mind giving rise to perceptions and ideas, which are the motions that an object impresses
on the nerves, that brings about thoughts in the mind via the pineal gland. These perceptions and
ideas incline and stimulate the will. In return the will has power to determine the direction of
animal spirits in order to carry out its wishes and it does so also by means of ideas. This bidirectional causal interaction is how humans are created to operate and function. The body acts
directly on the faculty of understanding to produce ideas, and indirectly on the will by means of
ideas. Additionally, the soul does not directly move bodies; but by determining the movements
of animal spirits via the pineal gland, it does bring about movement in the parts of body we wish
to move. The will can determine the configuration of animal spirits to bring about the desired
movement versus only having an indirect power over those configurations of animal spirits that
are linked to our ideas that generate passions – these falls under the command of the soul. The
soul has the authority to determine the direction with which animal spirits must go to implement
the will’s wishes, but it cannot increase or decrease the motion with which animal spirits exit the
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gland. Even though an indirect influence, nevertheless the will has the power in directing the
mind to think of ideas that are linked with the configuration of animal spirits that bring about
certain passions.230
Furthermore, La Forge tells us that, “He who willed to join them [mind and body] in this
way had to resolve at the same time to give to mind the thoughts which we observe it acquiring
on the occasion of motions of its body, and to determine the motions of its body in the way they
should be in order to be subject to mind’s will.” 231 In such passages La Forge acknowledges the
role God plays as creator of all things and as such He created mind and body in a such way that
they are both united and interact. This does not make La Forge an occasionalist, the view that
God is the only causal agent. Mind and body do act on each other because the mind has thoughts
due to the motion of body and motion is determined in body to bring about movement.
Moreover, as discussed, the lack of similarity between mental and corporeal events rules
out any transeunt efficient causation, but on Nadler’s “occasional causation” account both the
finite substances body and mind are in a position to be a primary cause of an effect. Going back
to Nadler’s suggested “occasional causation” model: A → B → e, A is the occasional cause of e
(effect); A occasions B to bring about or cause e. But e occurs only after A has occasioned B
whose active power brings about the effect e. Thus, A is the cause of e (not as the traditional
efficient cause) rather, A (as an occasional cause) occasions B, whose active power and activity
brings about the effect e. In the case of body-mind interaction: A (Motions of body) elicits → B
(Mind + Pineal Gland) as the primary cause produce the → e (effect - ideas). The action of
external objects and the movements of parts of the body make an impression, which are motions
of animal spirits, hit the nerve fibers. The impressions are carried to the pineal gland where the
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soul must perceive the impressions and be aware of the idea. Thus, what is carried to the mind
via pineal gland is: idea plus corporeal species (flow of animal spirits, the motion of the gland,
and the thought of the soul which are immediately connected with them) which occasion the
mind (as the primary and proximate cause) to stimulate an idea. Motions of the body (caused by
an external object) are the occasional (secondary) cause but the mind as the total and primary
cause produces the idea.
Similarly, in the case of mind-body interaction: A (Mind - by determination of the will to
direct the animal spirits) → B (Body + Pineal Gland) → e (effect - movements in limbs). The
determination of the will (volitional power of mind) directs the animal spirits to exist in a
particular cavity of the body to bring about or cause movement of limbs. The determination of
the will as the occasional (secondary) cause elicits the body as the total and primary cause to
bring about the effect of movement in the limbs. In this scenario (according to “occasional
causation”) body is the active agent whose causal activity causes the movement in our limbs
while the desire to move is caused by the will’s wishes as the occasional cause. Both finite
substances participate as causal agents. Thus, interaction of mind and body is not occasionalistic.
However, Nadler does not extend this same causal activity of bodies to body-body cases.
The discussion to be picked up in Chapter Four is to evaluate why this causal agency given to
bodies in the mind-body/body-mind cases cannot be applied to body-body cases. Accordingly, as
covered in Chapter Two, body-body cases are not considered as a ‘true’ union since they do not
fulfill all of the union criteria but they do meet the first part of the union criteria which states that
two things must share some kind of relation, resemblance, or dependence. And bodies do share
in a relationship of mutual proximity and dependence which facilitates their interaction
according to the laws of motion. Based on the “occasional causation”: A (body) → B (body) →
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e (effect – motion). Body A linked to body B due to their shared relationship of mutual
proximity and dependence elicits body B – as the primary and proximate cause – produces the
effect – motion. The type of motion will be dependent on the laws of motion. For example, if
body A is light then there will be more resistance in body B which will produce a slight motion.
But if body A is heavy then there will be less resistance in body B and this in will produce a
greater motion. This shared relationship and laws set and grounded in God allows even bodies to
be primary and proximate causes although in the secondary sense
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Chapter 4 – The Case Against Occasionalism in La Forge

4.1 Introduction: Arguments for La Forge’s Occasionalism

In the contemporary scholarly literature a consensus has been reached that La Forge held
a non-occasionalist account of mind-body interaction. Nadler, in particular, distinguishes
between occasionalism and occasional causation such that the former entails the latter but that
occasional causation does not entail occasionalism, thus exempting mind-body interaction from
occasionalism. Nonetheless, when it comes to body-body causation, the consensus, including
Nadler, is that such interactions are fully occasionalist (not merely occasional). For example,
Nadler writes that, “I argue that La Forge’s occasionalism is quite limited, and that he employs
God’s constant causal activity to explain only body-body relations.”232 Garber, groups La Forge
in with other occasionalist thinkers who argued for occasionalism as a solution to Cartesian
problems, such as Cordemoy and Geulinx. 233 According to Sukjae Lee, “in the case of La Forge,
his credentials as an occasionalist about the causal efficacy of extended substances or bodies has
never been in doubt.”234
Against this consensus regarding body-body interaction, I argue in the next section that
such occasionalist conclusions attributed to La Forge are not unjustified. What we find in the
Treatise in regard to body-body interaction appears to be puzzling. Puzzling because we have
passages such as,
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Let us conclude from all this, first, that it is impossible for a body to have from itself the
power to move itself or to move another body…a body could never move another unless
it is first moved itself and unless it has the force to move a whole circle of bodies… 235

According to Nadler such passages are clear evidence that La Forge adopts the doctrine
of occasionalism (employing God’s constant causal activity) to explain body-body cases.236
Hence, the goal of this chapter is to evaluate Nadler’s position that La Forge is an occasionalist
in regard to body-body cases and the role of divine conservation. In pursuit of this I will
examine what La Forge has to say in chapter 16 of Treatise on the Human Mind (1666) the
chapter which Nadler uses key paragraphs to make the case that La Forge is an occasionalist. I
will demonstrate that even in body-body cases La Forge is not an occasionalist. For, if we mirror
body-body relations to what we have already uncovered in the mind-body case (what I argue is
the paradigmatic case of two finite substances) we see that in the body-body case one body
shares in a relation of mutual proximity and dependence with another body, and because of this
relation, bodies like minds have the power to determine motion. Attributing the power to
determine motion from one body to another is different from claiming that bodies possess the
motive force behind the creation of motion. This difference (determination of motion vs. creation
of motion) in La Forge’s causal model will facilitate a better understanding that particular
causes, mind and body, have the same causal efficacy which is, to determine and direct motion.

4.1.1 Types of Occasionalism
The occasionalist doctrine of causation states that no created things have causal agency
and that God is the primary and total source of all effects found in nature. Bodies and minds, as
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finite beings, equally lack causal agency. For example, the mind does not cause the body to take
any action and vice versa, bodies have no causal powers over minds to bring about thoughts.
God is the one and only true cause bringing about all effects. For example, “when a needle
pricks the skin, the physical event is merely an occasion for God to cause the relevant mental
state (pain); a volition in the soul to raise an arm or to think of something is only an occasion for
God to cause the arm to rise or the idea to be present to the mind…”. 237 There are a variety of
occasionalism even though all subscribe to the core doctrine that God is the only true cause.
There is Islamic occasionalism which develops out of the Ash’arite school of Kalam (Islamic
doctrine of theology). 238 Al-Ghazali (1055 – 1111) who argues for occasionalism in his work,
The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa), was apprehensive to make the claim
(as Ibn – Sina (Avicenna: 970 – 1037) does) that the causal relations between a cause and the
effect is such that the cause necessarily brings about the effect. 239 In contemporary terms, this
version of occasionalism is known as the no necessary connection position – i.e., that there is not
a necessary connection between causes and their effects on the particular finite level. If one
ascribes to this doctrine, then Al-Ghazali feared there would be no room for miracles since
effects must necessarily follow from its cause. As such Al-Ghazali endows all causal
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necessitating powers to God and denies any causal powers to finite substances. As such divine
omnipotence has no limitation except those state of affairs that are logically inconsistent.
There is the Medieval Christian version of occasionalism that appears in Nicholas of
Autrecourt (1295/1298 - 1369). Familiar with Al-Ghazali’s work he also criticized the view that
there must be a “necessary connection” between cause and effect. However, his worry wasn’t so
much that we must allow room for miracles but rather that we lack certitude in regard to the
causal connection between the cause and its effects. This implies that he was a skeptic rather
than an occasionalist per se even though he employed Al-Ghazali’s occasionalistic ideas to make
his arguments. There is Cartesian occasionalism, often ascribed to Descartes or his successors,
because of Descartes’s physics which holds that: 1) matter is passive and 2) motion is created
and maintained by God. As Sukjae Lee asserts, “in the case of La Forge, his credentials as an
occasionalist about the causal efficacy of extended substances or bodies has never been in
doubt.”240 According to both Nadler and Lee limiting La Forge’s occasionalism to body-body
interaction is an appropriate assessment since the mind in and of itself can be the cause of ideas –
a causal activity that is not extended to bodies. Thus, they ascribe a partial occasionalism to La
Forge, governing body-body interaction, but not mind-body or mind-mind interaction. Of course,
there are those that were both Cartesian and an all-encompassing occasionalists, such as Geraud
de Cordemoy (1626 – 1684) and Malebranche (1638 – 1715) who denied all causal efficacy to
both substances – mind and body. Nadler writes that,
the occasionalism of Malebranche, Cordemoy, Clauberg, Geulincx, and La Forge all
differ in scope and in argumentation. Malebranche, for example, is a thorough-going an
occasionalist as one could hope for, as is Cordemoy. Clauberg’s alleged occasionalism,
on the other hand, appears to be limited to mind-body relations. And then there is the
case of Arnauld, who employs occasionalism to explain only one facet of mind-body
relations, namely, how bodily motions occasion God to produce sensations in the mind. It
may be that a limited employment of occasionalism, such as La Forge’s, is the rule rather
240
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than the exception among Cartesians. In any case, we should be very careful about any
general claims we may be tempted to make about “the occasionalists.” 241

It seems then, one need not ascribe to a strict and universal version of occasionalism. A partial
occasionalism of body-body interaction may allow for causal activity between finite substances
as it relates to mind-body interaction wherein mind is the causal agent and not God. This partial
occasionalism is what Nadler ascribes to La Forge. This partial occasionalism draws upon what
Nadler refers to as the passive nature argument. Bodies (Cartesian extended substances) are by
nature passive and lack the power to initiate or transfer movement to other bodies. La Forge does
not employ the no knowledge argument that extends to the case of mind-body interaction as seen
in Geulincx and Malebranche. According to Geulincx, “you are not the cause of that which you
do not know how to bring about.” 242 In this version of occasionalism minds also lack causal
power. Since, as a true cause you need to have knowledge of what the intended effects would be
and mind’s lack this kind of knowledge.243

4.1.2 Nadler’s account of Body-Body Cases and Why it is Occasionalistic
Nadler argues that La Forge’s occasionalism is limited to body-body cases, but applicable
to body-body cases because it is in these cases that God’s constant causal activity is required.
What’s important to recognize is that Nadler’s definition of occasionalism applies to particular
events. He thinks it’s an error to assume that occasionalism is applied only to general laws and
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not to particular events. He states, “God is actually and immediately moving individual bodies
around and producing particular mental events, although God does always act in accordance with
certain general laws and never arbitrarily. This difference is important for my argument.” 244 In
this account of occasionalism Nadler acknowledges that mind and body do causally interact but
not in the standard efficient causation kind of way – where the cause brings about the effect. But
in the case of body-body interaction Nadler claims that La Forge’s occasionalism is clear and
straightforward. Below is an analysis Nadler gives on La Forge’s chapter 16: How the Mind and
Body Act on Each Other, and How One Body Moves Another and ultimately reaches the
conclusion that the body-body case is a clear-cut case of occasionalism. Below I will also review
and present La Forge’s points for comparison. But, for now, according to Nadler “La Forge
offers four main arguments to the effect that bodies have no motive force, no power to cause or
sustain motion either in themselves or in other bodies.”245
1) “our clear and distinct concept of body, which includes only extension and its
properties, represents body as a purely passive and does not contain any such active
force.”
2) “the motion of a body is simply a mode of it, and (on the Cartesian ontology) modes
cannot pass from the substance to which they belong to some other substance. Thus, real
transitive causation – whereby one body would communicate or transfer its motion to
another body – is ruled out.”
3) “motive force is not inherent in bodies, and hence that ‘no body has the power to move
itself’”
4) God is required to “sustain it [the world] in existence from moment to moment by a
kind of continuous production.”246

244

Nadler, 2010, p. 107
Nadler, 2010, p. 110
246
Ibid. – (for points 1- 4)
245

92

Nadler concludes that the force required to move bodies can only be done by the will of God and
body-body “relations” are occasionalistic. Nadler draws such conclusions from what La Forge
has to say in Chapter 16 in regard to the kind of power a body has. According to La Forge,
…I also claim that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can cause change in
it or in any of its parts, in the second moment of their creation, if the Creator does not do
so himself. Since it was He who produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not
only must he continue to produce it if he wished it to continue to exist but also, since he
cannot create it everywhere or nowhere, he must put it in place B himself if he wishes it
to be there.247

According to Nadler the above quote is a strong argument to make the case that bodies have no
causal power to move themselves or other bodies. God is the transeunt efficient cause of motion
and rest in bodies. Although the above quote from La Forge appears as evidence condemning
him to an occasionalistic account of body-body interaction below I will demonstrate that the
above quote merely describes the role of God in La Forge’s metaphysical system as the creator
of motion. While, in regard to mind-body interaction or as Nadler puts it “relations” he has a
different viewpoint. According to Nadler,
Now to say that the external material body – or, more precisely, the motions it
communicates to the brain – is the “occasional” cause of the idea does not commit La
Forge to an occasionalism here. 248 First, note that these motions do not serve God as an
occasion to cause an idea; rather, they serve the mind itself, which is endowed with an
active causal power. Second, one can call the bodily motions an “occasional cause” and
still insist that they are not without a kind of causal efficacy…For La Forge, as well as for
others, an occasional, remote, or accidental cause is still a cause: an inferior type of cause
when compared to an efficient cause, to be sure, but a real cause nonetheless…The bodily
motions do really occasion or elicit the mind’s own efficient causality. It is in this sense
that La Forge thinks he can still speak of the “power” the body has to excite thought. 249
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On the face of it, it appears that we are discussing two different bodies. The one body in the
body-body case and a second body in the mind-body case. The body in the body-body case has
no power while in the mind-body case the body does have some kind of power even if it is
inferior to an efficient cause. The body in the mind-body case has causal efficacy in the remote
and accidental sense as Descartes writes in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet,
…if we consider that something can be said to derive its being from something else for
two different reasons: either the other thing is its proximate and primary cause, without
which it cannot exist, or it is a remote and merely accidental cause, which gives the
primary cause occasion to produce its effect at one moment rather than another. 250

Nadler picks up this point from Descartes and states that bodies, as remote and accidental cause
(while secondary), cause thoughts in minds. Furthermore, Nadler tells us that the body in the
mind-body case does not actually move a mind. The body is not acting on the mind to bring
about movement, “the presence or absence of moving force in the body is thus irrelevant in this
context. While denying that bodies have moving force might commit you to occasionalism in the
body-body case, it certainly does not commit you to occasionalism in the body-mind case…”251
Then, both in the body-body case and mind-body case we do have a unified concept of body. In
both scenarios body does not have a motive force and it is not an efficient cause but in the
context of body-body cases we do require that the body have motive force or act as an efficient
cause while in the mind-body case we are giving the role of efficient causation to the mind and
do not have the same requirement for the body. If Nadler allows that body has not changed in
either case, meaning body is always passive and does not possess motive powers, why do the
requirements change for how body operates in the mind-body case versus the body-body case?
Furthermore, body being united to mind seems to give it (body) a special role or a special
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influence that are not given to body in the body-body case. I argue this specialness that is
attributed to body in the mind-body case is something that the secondary literature has attributed
to body in their interpretation of Cartesian philosophy in trying to keep dualism and yet have an
explanation for causal interaction. If we go back to Chapter Two and look at what La Forge
presents to us in regard to relations and the union criteria, we can see that the operation and the
power of body in both body-body case and mind-body case is the same. Thus, if the role of the
body in mind-body interaction is not occasionalistic, why must we conclude that it is in the
body-body cases? It is these very issues that lead La Forge to start Chapter 16 of the Treatise
with the statement that,
I think most people would not believe me if I said that it is no more difficult to conceive
how the human mind, without being extended, can move the body and how the body
without being a spiritual thing can act on the mind, than to conceive how a body has the
power to move itself and to communicate its motion to another body. Yet there is
nothing more true, and that is what I propose to show in this chapter. 252

Grappling with the problems of Cartesian philosophy, many assume that an account of causal
interaction between two distinct substances (mind and body) would be a more difficult task than
the case of body-body interaction because body-body interaction is an example of same
substance interaction. However, La Forge tells us that cases of body-body interaction are as
difficult because you have to account for how a body has the power to move another body and
bring about self-movement. Furthermore, La Forge states that “there is nothing more true” than
that there is interaction between mind-body and body-body
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4.2 What La Forge Has to Say About Bodies
It is significant that La Forge discusses his account of mind-body union (and the
foundation for interaction) in chapters 13 - 15, prior to taking up the question of body-body
interaction. Furthermore, by the time La Forge picks up the discussion on body-body interaction,
he has already provided a well-established relational system of how a mind and body, body and
body, mind and mind are linked (discussed in Chapter Two). Choosing such an order of
discussion (first giving an account of shared relation, followed by union of mind and body and
then tackling cases of body-body) suggests that mind and body cases are not the exception but
rather the norm and as such we can use what La Forge offers there to guide us in the body-body
cases.
This is why, La Forge tell us that,
The cause of motion of bodies is not therefore something which is obvious as one might
think, and that is why I said at the beginning that it was no more difficult to conceive how
the mind moves the body than how one body moves another because, in fact, one must
have recourse to the same universal cause in both cases. 253

Thus, according to La Forge, conceiving how the mind and body interact and how the body and
body interact is equal in difficulty as the same universal cause must be applied to both.254 To
better understand the role of each cause, general (universal) and particular (secondary), La Forge
tells us that there is a difference between “the cause of a movement and the cause which
determines it, because one is often different from the other just as movement is from the force
which makes things move.”255 We clearly see the effects in the world when a body moves but
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we never perceive the force which allows a heavy object to move downwards or how one body
has the power to move another body.
La Forge tells us that the word motion can be used in two different ways. There is
motion that is a mode of body and is not distinct from the body, does not pass from one body to
another and it does not belong to the spiritual substance. The word motion in this sense is just
“considered in the body which is moved, is only the ‘transfer of a body from the vicinity of those
which are in immediate contact with it and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of
other bodies’”.256 But the second way in which the word motion is considered is a force that has
the capacity to “transport a body from one vicinity to another and which applies it successively
to different parts of the bodies which it leaves behind.”257 This motion is something distinct from
the body and the application of the word is also distinct. This usage of the word motion is not a
mode found in corporeal substance. From this La Forge reaches the conclusion that,
Now if the force which moves is distinct from the thing which is moved and if bodies
alone can be moved, it follows clearly that no body can have the power of self-movement
in itself. For if that were the case this force would not be distinct from the body, because
no attribute or property is distinct from the thing to which it belongs.258

Hence, if a body does not have the power to move itself then it will also lack the power needed
to move another body. If a body is in motion it is because something distinct (from itself) pushed
it into motion. To drive this point home, that the force that brings about movement is not the
body itself, La Forge gives two instances which lead to the conclusion that God is the one true
cause of motion. In the first illustration where God has removed all motion, matter (always
created at rest) is not active and as such cannot move itself or bring about any movement. Since,
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“it was He who produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not only must he continue
to produce it if he wishes it to continue to exist but also…he must put it in place B himself if he
wishes it to be there.”259 It is God who brings matter into existence, it is God who continues to
ensure its continuous existence, and it is God who moves matter from one place to another.
In the second illustration God has infused motive force in bodies;
Let us even consider that if God gave this particular body A all the motive force which he
uses at present to move the whole of nature, it would not be enough even all that to
change its location, both because it would not be able to overcome the resistance of the
rest of matter which we assume is at rest, and because in order to make body A capable
of leaving its place to enter that of another body, the other body which it replaces would
also have to move at the same moment that body A begins to move, since it is impossible
for the first body to take the place of a second unless, at the same time as it tries to do so,
the second body leaves that place and enters that of a third body and the third enters that
of a forth, and so on. 260
Only God could bring about such an orchestrated movement of bodies. Matter alone cannot
move itself. It is God who can bring about the displacement of one body for another body.
Thus, even in a scenario that God has given bodies motive force it is still God’s causal power
that brings about movement from place A to place B. Matter cannot bring about self-movement.
This leads to the conclusion that, “it is impossible for a body to have from itself the power to
move itself or to move another body.” 261
Now, from these two instances it is easy to see why an occasionalist reading is attributed
to La Forge, but it is important to recognize La Forge’s aim in giving these two illustrations. His
aim is to establish that, God “is the first, universal and total cause of motion”. 262 La Forge agrees
with the occasionalistic stance that active/motive force lies with the will of God. However, La
Forge differentiates between universal and particular causes which mirrors itself onto the
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description of what is the universal cause of motion and what is the particular cause that
determines the specific direction and speed of the motion. Bodies do not have the power to bring
about self-movement but, bodies can determine their own motion. 263 This point is also made by
Descartes in Principles of Philosophy when he states that, “there is a difference between motion
considered in itself <the motion of a thing> and its determination of the direction can be altered,
while the motion remains constant”. 264 Meaning the total quantity of motion in the universe
remains constant because God as its author maintains it but the direction of bodies in motion can
be altered and this alteration of direction does not lie with God.
God is the creator and sustainer of motion because bodies are not the source of motion
but rather have the capability to determine specific motions. La Forge tells us this very point
when he states that,
Although God is thus the universal cause of all the motion which occurs in the world, I
also recognize bodies and minds as the particular cause of these same motions, not really
in producing any ‘impressed’ quality in the way the Schools explain it, but in determining
and forcing the first cause to apply his force and motive power to the bodies to which he
would not otherwise have applied it, according to the way He decided to govern himself
in relation to bodies and minds; that is, bodies, according to the laws of motion which are
so well explained in Book Two of Mr Descartes’s Principles;265 and for minds, according
to the scope of the power which He chose to give to their wills. The power of bodies and
minds to move consists in that alone. Therefore, it is no more difficult to understand how
a mind can act on a body and move it, than to conceive how one body pushes another. 266

In book of two of Principles of Philosophy rule 37 we get the first law of nature which states, “each and every
thing, in so far as it can, always continues in the same state; and thus what is once in motion always continues to
move. Rule 39 we get the second law of nature which states, “all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body
moving in a circle always tends to move away from the center of the circle which it describes”. Finally in rule 40 we
get the third law of nature which states, “if a body collides with another body that is stronger than itself, it loses
none of its motion; but if it collides with a weaker body, it loses a quantity of motion equal to that which it imparts
to the other body”.
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Bodies and minds (as discussed in Chapter Three) as particular/secondary causes can determine
motion – the motion that is already created by God. Bodies by determining and forcing the first
cause (God) to apply his force and power to push other bodies and the will’s volitional power to
determine the motion of the animal spirits to bring about movement in the limbs. This
determination is done according to the laws of motion and in the case of mind according to the
laws of union. In this, even limiting sense, bodies have power and causal efficacy.
The union of mind and body provides the basis for the mutual dependence of the
operations of mind and body on one another. By analogy, we can see how one body is linked to
another body (as discussed in Chapter Two) by mutual proximity and dependence.
Action
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Recall that no union of body-body is required as they share the same nature, so a bodybody relation is not considered a true union according to La Forge. In body-body cases the
“union” and their ultimate interaction is founded in the sameness of substance, corporeal
substance, and not based on two things that are distinct. Thus, body-body cases do not meet the
first part of the union criterion – that the union is between two distinct things. But body-body
cases do meet the second part of the union criterion which states that two things must share a
relation, resemblance, or dependence which allows two things to be considered as one. Bodybody interaction is between two things (although not distinct) that share in a relation of mutual
local proximity and dependence. The interaction of a body with another body is a simpler case
than a mind with a body or a body with a mind, because it does not require a true union of
distinct things, but it is not different in the requirement that there be a relation of proximity and
mutual dependence. Nor is the case of body-body interaction different in kind from the case of
mind-body interaction, as La Forge explains in the quotation above. In other words, God is the
universal cause of motion whereas bodies and minds are the particular causes and determinants
of particular motions, i.e., “in determining and forcing the first cause to apply his force and
motive power to the bodies to which he would not otherwise have applied it, … that is, bodies,
according to the laws of motion … and for minds, according to the scope of the power which He
chose to give to their wills.” [my emphasis].
For this reason, body-body and mind-body cases should be understood according to the
same general model of causation. God is the universal cause of all motion, and minds and bodies
are the particular causes, i.e., determinants of particular motions. Moreover, it is useful to
consider the mind-body case as paradigmatic in understanding La Forge, rather than the bodybody case, pace Nadler et al. In doing so, the claim that La Forge was an occasionalist with
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respect to body-body interaction loses its plausibility. The body does not have the power itself to
move itself or to move another body but, “I [La Forge] reply that if they were already in motion,
this body would not move them but would merely determine their motion.”267 Bodies and minds
were never to be viewed as the universal and total cause of motion in La Forge’s metaphysical
schema – it is God, but holding that God is the universal cause does not entail occasionalism.
Nadler acknowledges that La Forge seems not to embrace an occasionalist account of mind-body
interaction, but concludes otherwise for body-body interaction. Yet, La Forge seems to hold the
same position on the power of the soul with respect to the body as he does for the body with
respect to the body:
soul does not have the power either to increase or decrease the motion of spirits which
exist from the gland; it has the power only to determine them, that is, to turn them in the
direction in which they must go in order to execute its will. 268

Similar to bodies, minds are not the total and universal cause. Minds, like bodies do not increase
or decrease the total quantity of motion but have the power to determine its direction. Mind and
body are on the same footing as far as having causal efficacy – both determine the direction of
motion. Thus, body in the mind-body case does not have a special standing because it is united to
a mind as Nadler holds. La Forge (and Descartes) never require bodies to have motive force
regardless of discussing body-body or mind-body cases. Although minds can imagine new ideas
like a winged horse and in this sense Nadler views minds as different than bodies – this ability of
self-generating ideas. However, the explanatory discussion on the production of ideas is a
descriptive account of the operation of the mind and specifically on the faculty of imagination (a
consequence of the union between mind and body) and not a causal account. Causality, for La
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Forge, is all about determining the direction of motions in relation to bodies and minds. The
faculty of imagination and the faculty of understanding are the ways in which the mind operates
but that tells us nothing about the causal efficacy of the mind. The scope of the mind’s power to
direct the body, including or perhaps especially its animal spirits, to general ideas and
movements in the body, depend on the local and mutual dependences of the mind-body and
body-body relations.
La Forge establishes a key distinction between universal and particular causes, which
then grounds his subsequent attribution of secondary causal power to wills--to move bodies, and
to bodies--to direct the movements of other bodies. La Forge’s argument that mind and body
both have the power to determine motion is not an argument that Nadler takes into consideration.
Accordingly, Nadler writes,
Bodies are moved both by inanimate bodies and by animate bodies (e.g., a baseball
thrown by a pitcher). When bodies are moved by inanimate bodies, the story is a
straightforward occasionalist one. When an animate body (in voluntary motion) moves
another body, however, the bodily motions that occasion God to move the second body
are themselves caused by the mind. Thus, even though the second body’s causal
relationship to the first body is a strictly occasionalist one, a human mind (or, more
precisely, a volition) plays a role in the overall occasionalistic picture: had the mind not
moved its own body in a certain way, the “first cause” (God) would not have been
“determined and obliged” to “apply his force” and move the second body in a certain
way. It is in this sense that one must make room for les esprits in addition to les corps as
“particular causes” – occasioning causes – of the motions of bodies moved by God. 269

For Nadler, one inanimate body can move another inanimate body and in these cases the causal
account is strictly occasionalistic. In addition, one animate body (a body united to a mind), can
move another inanimate body and this causal account of interaction is also occasionalistic. Even
though, the volitional powers of the mind have a role to play, in Nadler’s view the overall
account of the animate body moving another inanimate body remains occasionalistic. What
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Nadler describes in the above passage is that God as the first cause applies his force to get the
second body (the inanimate body) to move. As Nadler sees it, is that A (animate body – united to
a mind uses its volitional power) to move in a certain way that occasions → B (God) as the first
cause to “determine and obliged” to “apply his force” → e (effect - to bring about the movement
in the second body) movement in the inanimate body. Thus, the causal relationship between the
animate and inanimate body is one of occasionalism. However, in the above description of
occasional causation, it seems that Nadler describes an account in which the finite substances,
animate body, elicits (occasions) God, the infinite substance. In this scenario, the animate body
has causal efficacy to cause God to apply its force and yet the same body only has an
occasionalistic relationship with the second body. It is important to point out that Nadler himself
says that in the occasional causation model, “neither, then, does occasional causation require
God to be the being B…” and the relationship of A to e is one based on a “nomological”
relationship – a law like relationship. 270 If we were to keep to this nomological relationship
between A (the first body) and e (the movement of second body) then the first body, according to
the three laws of motion, could determine motion and bring about movement in the second body.
Yet, in the above depiction, Nadler asserts that the relationship between A and e is based on an
occasionalistic causal relationship. It is clear that Nadler does not take into account the power
that bodies have – the power to determine and direct motion.
If we adhere to what La Forge has told us, that body has the power to determine motion
while obeying the three laws of motion, and apply this to Nadler’s occasional causation model
then: when body A collides with body B we can say that body A and B are linked due to their
relationship of mutual proximity and dependence and adhere to the three laws of motion which
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facilitate the determination of motion. So that when body A, due to its greater weight (later
understood as mass) over body B, collides with body B, then body B is moved. A (motions in
the body) as the occasional cause (linked to body B due to the relationship of mutual proximity
and dependence it has to body B) elicits body B → B (body) according to the laws of motion: “if
its [body A] power of continuing is greater than the resistance of the other body [B], it carries
that body along with it”271 as the proximate cause brings about the effect → e (effect) movement
of body B since its resistance is less than the power of body A. La Forge’s account of mutual
proximity provides us with the missing connection that body A and body B share, and this does
not require one to invoke God in the causal account. This in turn facilitates a non-occasionalistic
account of body-body interaction.

4.3 Conservationism and Continuous Creation

Nevertheless, even when an account is established that describes universal and particular
causes there is still the claim that conservationism reduces to continuous creation which is
another frame for understanding occasionalism. The view that God creates and maintains the
existence of motion over time is conservationism. However, it has been argued in literature that
conservationism is continuous creation. 272 The argument is that the difference between creation
and conservation is one based on conceptual distinction. The argument is that there is no
difference between God creating and God conserving. This is merely two words describing the
same act of God. We use the word creation to capture the first time God created something, but
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conservation is the word we use to capture the subsequent creations of God. For example,
Descartes in Principles of Philosophy writes,

It will be impossible for anything to obscure the clarity of this proof, if we attend to the
nature of time or of the duration of things. For the nature of time is such that its parts are
not mutually dependent, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that we now exist, it does
not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there is some cause – the same
cause which originally produced us – which continually reproduces us, as it were, that is
to say, which keeps us in existence. For we easily understand that there is no power in us
enabling us to keep ourselves in existence. We also understand that he who has so great a
power that he can keep us in existence, … 273
The above passage from Descartes has been used to argue that created things are not able to
contribute causally to their existence. It is God, which creates and conserves His created
creatures. Creation and conservation would be a distinct concept if created things were able to
cause their own existence. Going back to the passage used by Nadler from La Forge’s Chapter
16 we find a similar position as Descartes,
…I also claim that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can cause change in
it or in any of its parts, in the second moment of their creation, if the Creator does not do
so himself. Since it was He who produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not
only must he continue to produce it if he wished it to continue to exist but also, since he
cannot create it everywhere or nowhere, he must put it in place B himself if he wishes it
to be there.274

However, what should be noted is that, in both of the above passages the act of creation
from ex nihilo is being demonstrated and not continuous creation. The notion that God directly
moves physical bodies is the foundation for a continuous creation account. Secondary literature
uses the above passages to make the claim that God is the only causal agent and even if God
preserves, He alone creates and brings about change and as such, conservationism (preservation
of the world) is reduced to an account of continuous creation of the world. However, both
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Descartes and La Forge, with the passages above are showcasing that God is the universal cause
but a God who has minimal involvement once His creatures are created. All motion is created
and conserved by God but that does not commit La Forge to being an occasionalist. This is not
an occasionalist doctrine but rather a conservationism principle. According to La Forge,
…as he (God) had to use his omnipotent word to draw whole of nature out of
nothingness, it is also by means of his word that he drew this same nature out of chaos by
producing motion in it. And just as nature would revert to nothingness if he ceased
drawing it out from it at every moment in which he conserves it, it would likewise return
to its pristine confusion if He did not maintain the motion which he produced. 275
God continues to conserve what he has created this includes matter, motion, etc. God as both the
force and as the universal, general, and total cause creates motion and conserves matter but He
also imparts power to His created creatures to determine motion (different than creating new
motion). The theory that God’s contribution is minimal once He has created things is
conservationism. According to Sukjae Lee, “while God conserves substances with their power
in existence, when creatures are causally active in bringing about their natural effect, God’s
contribution is remote or indirect.”276 God creates and conserves the essential nature or essence
of created entities, but it is the individual entities that have their own causal activity. However,
in secondary literature the tendencies is to make the argument that “conservation is but
continuous creation”. 277 According to Lee, a version of the continuous creation argument has
existed since the 9th century. Accordingly, al-Ash’ari (873 – 935) founder of the Ash’arite
school based on the Greek theory of atomism, claims that movement of body does not consist of
a continuous process rather, the movement is based on small leaps. Body can move from point
1, to point 3, skipping point 2 because movement is based on a sequence of leaped instances. At
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each moment the body is created anew with its modes and properties. This version of continuous
creation holds the view that,
God brings about the accidents that inhere in the substances by continuously recreating
these modes. If God sustains the existence of the atoms themselves, while continuously
recreating all of their modes, then the occasionalist conclusion that God is the only
genuine cause does follow from this interpretation of divine conservative activity. 278
In La Forge the argument for continuous creation is found when he writes,
Let us assume then, for example, during the first moment of its creation, that it was
produced at rest. If that were the case, since God is immutable and acts in a way which
he never changes, how could we believe that this formless mass – which even lacks the
power to continue to exist on its own for a single moment – could in its entirety move
itself by its own power a moment later or could force one of its parts to change place?
But not only can it not change its condition by its own power; I also claim that there is no
creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can cause change in it or in any of its parts, in the
second moment of their creation, if the Creator does not do so himself. Since it was He
who produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not only must he continue to
produce it if he wishes it to continue to exist but also, since he cannot create everywhere
or nowhere, he must put it in place B himself if he wishes it to be there. For if he put it
anywhere else there is no force capable of removing it from that location. 279
According to Nadler’s interpretation, a body positioned at a place and time, is there because God
created the body and placed it there and it continues to be there because God conserves it. But,
“the relative place of a body just is a mode of it.”280 God, then, is responsible for both the
continued existence of body and its modes. Accordingly, “it is just because God sustains bodies
in specific and particular ways from moment to moment through a kind of continuous creation
that bodies have the modal properties they do. God’s creative/conserving power reaches through
a substance, so to speak, to its modes.” 281
The aim of the above passage from La Forge is to articulate what is both required and
lacked in a corporeal (inanimate) body as it relates to the creation of motion. The passage leads
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to the conclusion that God is the first, universal and total cause of motion. God also conserves
this motion due to his omnipotence knowing that if He does not the world would revert to a state
of confusion. Since, corporeal body (as well as the mind) are created by Him, one would assume
that when He creates his creatures, He creates them complete including their modes and
properties. Once created as part of His creations he continues to also conserve their existence as
he does with motion. He need not “reach through a substance” as it were in each moment to
create them anew. Nonetheless, La Forge also tells us that, “although God is thus the universal
cause of all the motion which occur in the world, I also recognize bodies and mind as the
particular causes of these same motions.” Furthermore, La Forge states that the,
force which moves can be considered either as belonging to God, who conserves in the
parts of matter as much transfer or motion as he put there in creating it (‘namely, by
continuing to move them with the same force’), or as belonging to a created substance,
for example, our soul and whatever else there may be to which God gave the power of
moving bodies (‘not by producing a new motion in the universe, but in merely
determining the first cause to exercise its force on a given subject’). 282
Finite substances also have force, not in the same sense as God as the universal and total cause
but, as particular secondary causes that have autonomy and can determine motion. If God, based
on his conservationism, just continually reaches into substances and changes their modes (state
of rest or in a state of motion), it is not clear why finite substances have causal efficacy (on the
weaker sense). Nadler also acknowledge this point by stating that, “the problem that will emerge
concerns the nature of the soul as an active substance. That is, I do not see how, after adopting
the particular doctrine of divine conservation that La Forge proposes, one can avoid the
conclusion that the soul itself is inactive, and for precisely the same reasons, given his
arguments, that the body is inactive.” 283 But that is a misunderstanding with Nadler’s
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interpretation of La Forge. La Forge is clear mind and body are in the same standing, they both
have the power to determine motion – that is all. God is the first, universal and total cause of
motion. Mind and body are particular (secondary) causes only. The best interpretation of La
Forge is that God creates the world, but he also conserves it. This model of conservationism does
not reduce to occasionalism because God is not creating modes and properties of substances
anew in each moment. God does communicate with His created creatures, mind and body but,
based on laws He has created – like the three laws of motion and the laws of union. He does not
need to “reach out” into substances and change their positions.

4.4 Conclusion: Body-body interaction is not occasionalistic

In the introduction of Nicolas Malebranche Philosophical Selections Nadler points out
that, “Malebranche and other occasionalists, such as Géraud de Cordemoy and Louis de la Forge,
are arguing that motion must ultimately have its source in something higher than passive, inert
extension of Cartesian bodies…”. La Forge does not deny this, but this also does not commit him
to occasionalism because La Forge advises that there are general and particular causes. The
general cause is the divine will and there are two particular cause, corporeal and spiritual.
Mind and body both have the same power, which is to determine motion but, because
mind-body union is the true union, mind-body cases are the exemplar cases and not the
exception. As such body-body cases mirror what we have discovered in the mind-body cases.
Body-body cases are not considered as true unions, but one body does interact with another
body, in determining motion, via their shared proximity and dependence and, communicate (or
act according) to God’s set laws – the three laws of motion.

110

God (besides creating motion) conserves the world and the laws set by Him (three laws
of motion and laws of union) and are grounded in the divine decree. This does not make La
Forge an occasionalist nor is it incompatible with La Forge’s metaphysical stance – that there is
both universal and secondary causation, and that bodies and minds are subjects of both. God is
the total and efficient cause of all motion in the universe in the sense that He creates and
conserves the total quantity of motion. Minds and bodies are finite substances that act as
secondary causes. While minds and bodies lack the omnipotent power that God has, they are not
required to do the same work as universal causes. The causal connection that secondary causes
have to their effects is not at all like the divine decree. Furthermore, La Forge tells us (and
Nadler agrees), that mind-body union, and their interaction, are based on equivocal causation.
Equivocal causation posits that the effect does not resemble the cause. Since, body-body cases
mirror the mind-body cases in this respect, body-body interaction must also be based on
equivocal causation. Like the case of mind-body causal interaction, resemblance is not at work in
body-body causal interaction. But what La Forge does offer in its place is an account of
proximity which has bodies interacting based on their shared relations of mutual proximity and
dependence. However, contra to Nadler, La Forge is not a pseudo occasionalist meaning he is not
an occasionalist in regard to body-body cases and an interactionist in regard to mind-body cases.
Rather, there are different types of causation in the world, universal and secondary causation,
and the secondary causes are conserved by God and God communicates with the particular world
based on the laws He has set for His creatures. The three laws of motion for body-body and the
laws of union for mind-body. His conservationism is not reduced to continuous creation. God
does not have to recreate anew each body or mind with their respective modes and properties.
God creates the world but has minimal involvement.
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